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Abstract
Google’s Android operating system was first announced to the public in 2007 and was
installed on more than three billion mobile devices by 2019. With the prevalence of
Android OS, Android malware has since proliferated. Android malware is malicious
software designed to exploit Android operating systems running on smart devices.
Some variants of Android malware have the capability of disabling the device, allowing a
malicious actor to remotely control the device, track the user’s activity, lock the device,
and so on. Moreover, the evolution and sophistication of modern Android malware
obfuscation and detection bypassing methods have significantly improved in recent
years, making many traditional malware detection methods (e.g. signature-based
detection) obsolete. In the meantime, malware samples from the same family might
disguise themselves with di↵erent functionality. These features might be relatively
stable over time to keep their purpose, or evolve and change to cope with the emerged
detection techniques. To tackle malware proliferation, we need a scalable Android
malware detection approach that can easily and reliably identify malware applications.
Although numerous malware detection tools have been developed, including systemlevel and network-level approaches, scaling up the e↵ective and lightweight detection
for a large package of apps remains challenging.
In this thesis, I propose data-driven methods to detect and analyze malicious
Android applications through static, dynamic, and custom-designed advanced features.
First, I propose the advanced features to improve both Android malware detection
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results and the robustness of the detection system, specifically focusing on Android
spyware, banking Trojans, and rooting malware. Second, I explore stability analysis
in 122 general Android malware families and 120 Android goodware families through
the definition of tau-Homogeneous Partition and the stability score of feature vectors
in a period, which reveals the top stable and unstable features during general Android
malware’s evolution over time. This thesis will help academics obtain a detailed
picture of Android malware detection based on data-driven analysis using basic and
advanced features. It will then act as a framework for subsequent studies to initiate
new studies and continue to direct research in the area more broadly.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Section 1.1

Background
According to Statista [1], Android was the most widely used smartphone OS in
the world with a market share of 87.9% at the end of the second quarter of 2017.
Another Statista report [2] shows that Android had more than 3 times as many
vulnerabilities reported in it as the nearest competing mobile operating system, iOS.
Around 84.8% of smartphones sold globally use the Android operating system in
2020 [3]. At the end of Feb 2021, there were more than 3 million applications
on Google Play, which is the official platform for Android applications [4]. Due
to numerous reasons, such as the transparent ecological mode of Android apps,
its coarse-grained permission control, and the potential to invoke third-party code,
several security attack surfaces are present, which seriously undermines the reputation
of Android applications. Statistics reveal that in 2016 alone, around 3.25 million
Android applications that were compromised with malware were detected, which
indicates that a fresh Android malware app was identified about every 10 seconds
[5]. To maintain the stability of the Android environment, a range of strategies have
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been suggested, including device reinforcement, vulnerability monitoring, developer
reviews, and malware detection. Among the di↵erent defense solutions, Android
malware detection is a commonly available security prevention mechanism that can
avoid malware from being released into the Android device marketplace or being
activated and used. Based on previous studies, Android malware detection and
analysis technologies can be categorized into three categories: static analysis-based
detection, dynamic analysis-based detection, and hybrid analysis-based detection
[6]. Static analysis [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] is based on the analysis of
suspicious code without running the Android script. It may achieve high data coverage
but faces multiple countermeasures such as code obfuscation and complex code loading.
Conversely, dynamic analysis [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]
requires the study of the Android application by running the code. This will reveal
threats that are not possible to find through static analysis, but the computing
resources and time expense of dynamic analysis are comparatively high. Hybrid
analysis [33, 34] is a process that blends static analysis and dynamic analysis to strike
a compromise between detection efficacy and performance. Besides, machine learning
theory is commonly applicable in the identification of Android malware, whether
based on static, dynamic, or hybrid analysis approaches. Compared with conventional
approaches, such as signature-based malware detection, which is based on detecting
unique characteristics in recognized malware, machine learning-based detection has
the potential to recognize previously unknown forms of malware and may have better
results in detection e↵ectiveness and quality. Some previous research has addressed
Android malware detection approaches relying on machine learning. However, there
are some shortcomings in the previous research, that is most of the previous papers
mostly used machine learning or deep learning approaches to identify and evaluate
harmful Android apps and good applications, but did not concentrate on particular
malware families, such as Android banking Trojans, Spyware, Rooting malware and

2

Introduction
so on.

Section 1.2

Contributions
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of research within this particular field of
work thus suggesting several innovative approaches to address these limitations. The
key contributions of this thesis are described as follows:
(a) Given an Android APK, we automatically predict whether it is a banking trojan,
spyware, rooting malware or not through the proposed android malware detection
systems. We show that our detection systems achieve this with high accuracy,
even after removing isomorphic feature vectors2 .
(b) We propose a novel structure called a Triadic Suspicion Graph (TSG for short),
along with two novel graph metrics called suspicion scores (SUS) and suspicion
ranks (SR) that are derived from TSGs. Moreover, we present a novel WindowBased TSG Feature Creator. We show that TSG-based features alone, when
used in conjunction with o↵ the shelf machine learning algorithms, generate high
predictive accuracy — but when used in conjunction with additional features
derived from more traditional static and dynamic analysis [35, 36, 37, 38, 39]
generate even better results. TSG-based features have some interesting defensive
properties in the presence of adversaries who might guess and obtain even a
large part of our training set. In the real world, attackers may subscribe to
2

We say that two APKs (hashes) are isomorphic when they have identical feature vectors. In such
cases, cross-validation by splitting the data may cause both the training and validation sets in a given
cross-validation fold to contain the same feature vectors, leading to an artificial and incorrect increase
in all measures of predictive accuracy. Past e↵orts in using machine learning in cybersecurity do not
say anything about the occurrence of isomorphic samples. In this paper, we present results after
removing isomorphic samples, though a removable appendix does present the results on isomorphic
samples. Note that an attacker can easily generate di↵erent hashes of the same samples by first
decompiling the APK, then changing only the package names or file paths in the manifest, and finally
repackaging it to generate a new APK with a di↵erent hash.
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or have access to malware datasets (e.g., through VirusTotal). We show that
even if the attackers have access to over 90% of the samples that we use, their
classification accuracy will still be low. This is shown via multiple distance-based
metrics as well as via a detailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We additionally show
that by a judicious choice of our training set from the set of openly available
samples, we further compromise the ability of an adversary to reverse engineer
our predictors.
(c) We conduct a thorough analysis of the features that best distinguish Android
Banking Trojans from both goodware and other types of malware (e.g. ransomware, SMS fraud). In particular, we show that the following features play
an important role: (i) requesting permissions to receive/modify SMS, read
phone state, and control system alert windows are each highly indicative of
ABTs, (ii) a low frequency of calls to some particular Android API packages
(e.g., android.widget and android.view), (iii) and possible repacking activities
through read, write and dynamic class load operations.
(d) We consider the task of separating spyware vs. goodware and spyware vs. other
malware, and compare the performance of several traditional and deep learning
methods. We show for the first time that ensemble learning with di↵erent
classifiers leads to better 10-fold performance for identifying spyware. To the
best of our knowledge, past ML-based malware detection studies have not studied
spyware in depth—they mostly consider the general problem of distinguishing
goodware vs. malware, and rely on just one individual classifier (e.g., SVM
in [36], RF and variants in [9, 40]). Instead, we propose an ensemble late fusion
(ELF) architecture that outperforms all individual classifiers.
(e) We identify the features that are key to separating modern Android spyware
(between July 2016 and July 2017) from goodware and from other malware.
4
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Existing work on malware characterization has not focused on spyware — in
addition to malware vs. goodware classification, they look at related problems
such as predicting malware spread [41] or distribution of goodware and malware
in di↵erent Android markets [42].
(f) We propose FARM (short for F eature transformation based AndRoid M alware
detector), a framework for detecting Android Rooting Malware which is robust to
certain types of attacks that we might expect malicious hackers to try out. FARM
takes well-known features for Android malware detection and introduces three
new types of feature transformations (Landmark based transformations, Feature
clustering-based transformations, and Correlation graph-based transformations)
that transform these features irreversibly into a new feature domain. We first
test FARM on 6 Android classification problems separating goodware and “other
malware” from 3 classes of malware: rooting malware, spyware, and banking
trojans. We show that FARM beats standard baselines when no attacks occur.
Though we cannot guess all possible attacks that an adversary might use, we
propose three realistic attacks on FARM and show that FARM is very robust to
these attacks in all classification problems.
(g) We present SAAM (short for Stability Analysis of Android Malware Families),
which investigates how malware samples from the same family changing over
time and the efficiency of detection techniques at the feature level. We also define
optimal-partition, stability score, and three di↵erent kinds of MG (malware
over goodware) ratio on the features over time in Android apk families, with a
detailed stability score analysis on 122 families of malware between 2012-2019
from VirusTotal, and 120 families of goodware between 2012-2020 from Google
Play Top free apps, with an average of 60 samples for each family. In the SAAM
project, we also summarize 4 kinds of top stable and unstable features over
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all the collected Android apk families, specifically on Android API features,
Android Permission features, Operation Code features, and System Command
features.

Section 1.3

Summary
In this thesis, we first introduce a novel family of structures called Triadic Suspicion
Graphs (TSG) resilient to adversary attacks and achieve high accuracy even while only
using a subset of training data. Then, we present the Ensemble Late Fusion (ELF)
architecture that combines the results of multiple classifiers’ predicted probabilities to
generate a final prediction of whether an Android app is spyware or not, and we also
conduct a detailed analysis of some important features in the spyware families. Third,
we propose FARM, which includes three new feature transformation techniques that
can be used to generate feature vectors that are very hard to reverse engineer. Last,
we introduce SAAM (Stability Analysis of Android Malware Families) framework and
study how malware samples from the same family evolve over time, as well as the top
stable or unstable features at the 4 di↵erent feature levels.
There also some limitations of this thesis work. First, we perform dynamic analysis
through the Koodous [43] online service, but it does not cover all possible execution
traces. For the classification system based on machine learning, the cost of getting
dynamic features is relatively high, and it is not easy to expand on a large scale. Then,
we observe that some Android apk samples crashed during real-time execution, and
this may lead to the reduction of the datasets. It will be worthwhile to investigate
some strategies to avoid apk crashing during analysis. Last, we only claim our feature
transformation techniques are robust to three certain types of adversarial attacks while
identifying a larger space of attacks and showing our FARM work could be modified
to withstand those attacks is an important future research topic.
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Chapter 2

Malware Categories
Android malware is actually no di↵erent from the di↵erent forms of malware you might
be acquainted with on desktop or laptop computers. It’s simply aimed at Android
users. Mobile malware is some form of malicious program or code intended to damage
a user’s device, such as trojans, adware, ransomware, spyware, rooting malware, or
phishing applications. Android malware will come from numerous di↵erent sites.
Third-party software shops, where people go to download new games, for example,
hide ransomware within various forms of applications. An Android user, unlike an
iOS user, can often do what’s known as sideloading an app. This does enable the
system owner to modify security permission, typically called ’unknown sources’. Users
will then downloading content directly from the internet to their smartphone, or from
their computer, bypassing the Google Play Store entirely. In the meantime, there
are several typical places Android malware will propagate like harmful downloads in
emails, accessing suspicious websites, or opening links from unknown senders. When
malware invades your Android operating system, it may do all kinds of things from
the mischievous to the outright fraudulent, and typically can harm the user via one or
more of the following behaviors:
• Show the user unwanted advertisements constantly.
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• Endanger the user’s system integrity.
• Spreads spam or instructions to impact other devices or networks from the
infected device.
• Access or steal personal information without the user’s permission.
• Get the administrative (root access) of the device of a user.
• Allow an intruder to connect, use, or otherwise run an infected device remotely
controlled operations.
• Endanger the user’s system integrity.
This chapter describes the main malware categories defined by Google Play Protect
[44] impacting users worldwide today. The e↵ect of these app behaviors ranges widely,
from fraudulently charging the user for services they did not approve or request, to the
exposure of user credentials and other personally identifiable information to malicious
actors.

Section 2.1

Distributed Denial of service
A denial-of-service attack is a cyber-attack in which the attacker tries to render the
computer or network capability inaccessible to its intended users for a limited duration
of time or forever. In a Distributed Denial of Service attack, several origins of the
incoming attack assaulting the target originate. This makes it very challenging to
avoid an assault merely by blocking a specific source, and a DDoS attack is like a
community of people that surround the entrance door to block any people from getting
inside. DDoS attackers also target web servers such as banks or credit card payment
gateways, which are hosted on high-profile websites.
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An application that commits DoS assaults against another operating system,
remote servers, or personal device formed part of a DDoS. This may happen, for
instance, when applications submit a high number of HTTP requests to overburden
remote servers.

Section 2.2

Backdoor
An Android backdoor malware can negate normal authentication procedures to enter
a device’s core system. Anyone that has remote access through the backdoor malware
can remotely issue system commands and upgrade the malware itself through the
remote control. A backdoor is accomplished by leveraging vulnerabilities in a web
application. When malware is mounted, it can be challenging to identify because of
the strong obfuscation, and the potential malicious activities may bring the app into
other types of malware categories such as spyware, phishing, and adware.
Usually, backdoors are used by hackers for a variety of illegal reasons as below:
• Intellectual Property abuse.
• Website defacement.
• Server penetration.
• Launch of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
• Disturbing website visitors (watering hole attacks).
• Advanced persistent threats or APT attacks.
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Section 2.3

Spyware
Spyware is software that illegally gathers information and sends it to an attacker’s
Command and Control server. Unlike ransomware (which explicitly locks a user’s
screen and prevents access to files through encryption), SMS fraud (where users may
notice charges), or banking trojans (where users may notice money disappearing from
their bank account), spyware is stealthy and can siphon data from calendars, emails,
SMSs, contact lists, social media accounts, and more, without the user becoming aware
of it. Spyware also constitutes an initial “reconnaissance” phase for more complex
attacks. For instance, spyware is often associated with more dangerous threats such
as cyber espionage targeting top executives, whaling attacks (in which large amounts
of money are siphoned o from companies), and private data theft for blackmail and
extortion purposes (e.g., compromising photos).
Commercial spyware always sends the device’s personal details without giving
appropriate warning or consent. Commercial spyware applications transfer data to a
third party rather than the app’s creator or supplier (for instance, to the user who
set up the app on the target device). Parents may use legal versions of these apps
to monitor their children, but the same apps may often be used to track another
user (for example, a spouse) without their consent or approval. Spyware may carry
out a range of harmful activities. Spyware, for example, can use browser cookies to
monitor a user’s online habits, such as queries, history, and downloads, for marketing
purposes. Spyware may also take the shape of system monitors, and can log nearly
everything you do on your machine. Both keystrokes, emails, chat-room conversations,
websites accessed, and programs run may be registered by device monitors. Freeware
is commonly used to mask system monitors.
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Section 2.4

Hostile downloader
A hostile downloader is a type of malware that may not be potentially dangerous
itself, but may download other potentially harmful software after its installation. If
there is legitimate cause to suspect that an app was developed to distribute malware
and the app has either downloaded malware or includes code that can download and
install malware, the app could be identified as a hostile downloader. Major browsers
and file-sharing applications aren’t deemed aggressive downloaders as long as they
don’t trigger hostile downloads without user permission and don’t push downloads
without user engagement (e.g., users looking for some specific rooting application for
their device). Via the hostile downloader, certain trojans may be downloaded into
the user’s device without the user’s awareness or permission, and when malicious
programs are downloaded and executed, they can destroy, interrupt, steal the sensitive
information, or break the integrity of the smartphone.

Section 2.5

Privilege escalation
Privilege escalation is a common way for attackers to breach previously expected
defenses. Attackers identify weak points in an operating system’s security check
procedures and manipulate them to obtain access to a device. In most instances, first
of all, the initial point of entry is not enough to obtain access or core data. They
can then try to elevate privilege in order to obtain access to additional system’s
administrative or do additional harm. Often, attackers who seek privilege escalation
find that normal security measures are insufficient, or that workers have been granted
rights that they do not require. In other instances, attackers use security bugs or try
to manipulate operating system weaknesses to obtain access to the system.
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An Android privilege escalation app that results in the compromise of the system’s
resources by acquiring elevated privileges or removing access to key security-related
functions. Often privilege escalation may involve malware that exploits passwords
from other applications and stops the user from installing an app.

Section 2.6

Ransomware
Ransomware is a type of program that attempts to block access to the user’s files
if a ransom is not paid. Some basic ransomware can lock the device so that it is
difficult for even a competent individual to remove it. More sophisticated malware uses
artificial intelligence to control the device. Ransomware can encrypt files, making them
unavailable, and threatens to erase all of them until a ransom is paid. In a properly
executed cryptoviral ransomware attack, retrieving the data without the decryption
key is an intractable challenge – and difficult to track when cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin are used for the ransoms, rendering tracking, and punishing the o↵enders
difficult. Ransomware attacks are normally carried out by viruses posing as a legitimate
file, which trick users into uploading or opening the file when they receive it in an
email.
An Android Ransomware app takes partial or extensive control of a computer
and demands money or access to such information. Some ransomware programs
encrypt data and demand payment to recover the data, and/or leverage the system
administrator functionality to guarantee that the ransomware cannot be deleted by a
normal consumer.
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Section 2.7

Rooting
Exploitable malware that takes over Android devices to gain root access and completely
control the phone. Once the mobile platform has been compromised, the application
can install other malicious programs and steal confidential information. Rooting
malware also tends to make its way onto devices through e-mail spam and phishing
sites. When rootkits are not destructive, they act as a means to deliver other programs
to the infected system.
Android rooting malware can enable the user to escalate privileges against the device’s operating system. There is a di↵erence between unauthorized and unauthorized
root applications. With non-malicious rooting apps, users are notified in advance that
they are going to root a device and some apps do not have malicious features. As well,
malicious rooting applications are known not to inform the user of the rooting.

Section 2.8

Trojan
A Trojan is a form of malicious code or program that pretends to be legitimate but
can actually do harm through control the user’s device. A Trojan can infiltrate and
damage, disrupts, steal, or in general, imposes some harm on a user’s data or on
the network. Trojans function like a genuine program or file to trick the user. This
type of malware tries to trick the user into running it on their device. Once installed,
the Trojan can accomplish what it was manufactured to do. Trojans can infect both
desktop computers and laptop computers. They can also impact mobile devices and
devices including smartphones and tablets.
Android Trojans are usually disguised as what appears to be a legitimate application.
In fact, it is a fake application with added malicious content. Cybercriminals will also
13
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put pirated apps on unauthorized and piracy app markets. Furthermore, these apps
can also steal information, and generate income by sending premium text messages.
Trojan malware has been particular targeted at Android devices, and they allow
cybercriminals to infect users’ devices and redirect users’ traffic through their home
Wi-Fi connections, allowing them to commit various crimes.

Section 2.9

SMS fraud
SMS fraud involves the distribution of malware by cybercriminals designed to target a
victim’s mobile device. After SMS fraud malware is installed on the user’s smartphone,
it makes unwanted phone calls and text messages without the user’s permission or
consent. These illegal calls or SMS messages are then routed to premium-charge
number services operated by cybercriminals, which creates substantial revenue sources
for cybercriminal networks.

Section 2.10

Spam
Spam is defined as messages sent to users of the internet with the motive of advertising,
phishing, or spreading a virus. Email spam is usually sent in bulk to users, the common
usage of the term. Spams come in various forms including unsolicited messages in
instant messaging, blog comments, social media posts, and mailed advertisements.
Those who regularly participate in mass email campaigns may upload an excel file to
the mailing system and send thousands of emails in the blink of an eye.
An Android spam application can send unwanted messages to the user’s contacts
or utilize the device as an email spam transmitter. Although it may not be specific
Android threats and these apps may not harm Android users or devices, they potentially
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contain harmful components for other platforms like iOS or Windows.

Section 2.11

Toll fraud
Toll fraud is a scheme where fraudsters conduct high-volume transactions involving
international calls through costly routes. Fraudsters dial a premium number and take
a share of the revenue created from calls to these numbers. Toll fraud involves three
ingredients: a lengthy and opaque value chain, misuse of a service that is given free
of charge, and kickbacks from the party collecting payments to the party sustaining
the service. In toll fraud, fraudsters share revenue with foreign premium number
suppliers and businesses that do business by buying and reselling number ranges from
carrier aggregators or directly from country regulators. Then these numbers are sold
to consumers who can use them as content utilities, such as adult chat lines, tech
assistance, and online voting.
A mobile toll fraud application may obtain subscriptions to utilities and products
using a user’s mobile phone bill. Toll fraud involves many forms of billing, and
Wireless access point (WAP), Mobile Airtime Transfer, and Direct Carrier Billing are
technology widely exploited in these forms of fraud. In particular, WAP fraud is one
of the most common forms of toll fraud which may involve tricking users into pressing
a button on a quietly loaded WebView, resulting in the user accidentally activating a
recurring subscription. A verification text or email is always blocked in order to avoid
alerting the victim to the scam.
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Static and Dynamic Features of
Android Applications
In this chapter, we include a quick summary of some static and dynamic features that
are widely used for Android malware detection in machine learning models.
Static analysis helps one to fully analyze all the content in the kit of the Android
framework (including source code and other resources such as images, strings, XML
files, and so on). Static analysis, though, may provide false results as many code
execution paths may never be executed. Dynamic analysis, on the other hand, fills the
void by running the application in a controlled and isolated setting (e.g., an emulator
or a sandbox) that helps one to see what the application is doing in operation and
gather behavioral data during real-time execution, such as the behavior of network
traffic, files read and written or binary files dropped. The malware developer could
have used anti-analysis strategies to identify the possibility that the application is
operating within an emulator or being debugged, and then adjust the behavior of the
application to mask any harmful behavior.
There are benefits and drawbacks of all approaches and they are complimentary.
Static and dynamic features created by static and dynamic analysis, respectively, are
typically combined while using machine learning methods for malware detection in
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order to optimize detection accuracy—not only on the Android platform but also on
other platforms.
In Section 3.1, we first address the static features of Android applications. We
begin by presenting the file structure of Android applications that are disassembled.
In the disassembled code file (Smali code), we then define a collection of static features
that can be collected from the content. The Section 3.2 briefly describes the dynamic
analysis mechanism and then gives information on dynamic features that are generally
correlated with Android applications.

Section 3.1

Static Features
Until application is assembled into an executable format, it is a set of di↵erent files and
directories. When investigating malware, we always find ourselves inspecting executable
code that has been assembled into the .dex file format. These executables contain
bytecode that is translated and executed within the ART or Dalvik runtimes. The
bytecode cannot be interpreted by humans, so they need to be converted into a more
understandable script, such as Smali code (disassembling) or Java code (decompilation).
Bytecode can then be disassembled relying on software such as APKtool [45] and
JADX [46] to get the source code for analysis. The analysis of Android applications is
achieved without needing to execute the applications because of the static contents of
application files. This contributes to static analysis’s attractiveness as an approach.
Inside the source files of an Android application, one can find the following
constituent items.
• Manifest Each Android application includes a AndroidManifest.xml file in its
root directory. The manifest file determines the structure and metadata of the
Android application. The manifest provides essential details of the application.
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of the manifest file of the malware sample Zsone 245

For example, the package name, which is conventionally a unique identification of
the application, file size, and version are included in the manifest. The manifest
also includes XML nodes that describe the basic behavior of applications. In
addition, permissions requested by the application are also listed in the manifest
file. Figure 3.1 shows the snapshot of the manifest file of a variant Zsone 245
of the Zsone trojan which has the potential to charge for SMS messages to
premium-rate numbers.1 .
• Java Android applications are typically built with Java programming language
that is stored in the JAVA folder.
• Res The res folder provides a range of tools outside the code itself such as XML
layouts and images used in the application.
• Build.gradle This file includes build-related configurations of the application.
A collection of static features can be derived from an Android application such
as by scripts that automatically extract certain features. We now introduce several
generally used static features as below [47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
1

More details on this particular trojan are available on VirusTotal https://www.virustotal.
com/gui/file/3274445785390407159794d4085b12fb400d1f4d56a0707409c6122dd7a21411/
community
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59, 60, 7, 61, 62].
• Permission Features Permissions must be required by Android applications to
access confidential user data (e.g. messages) or some interface functions (e.g., to
send SMS messages). It is necessary to specify these permissions in the manifest
file. We may develop a range of features relevant to the permissions that the
application requests. For instance, one can create a ” permission:NAME ” binary
function, with ” NAME ” being substituted by the name of each permission.
This form of feature indicates whether an application requires the corresponding
permission. Permissions can be divided into three levels of security according to
the guidelines on the official Android developer website 2 : normal permissions,
signature permissions, and dangerous permissions. Dangerous permissions are
those that either include users’ private data or could potentially impact certain
data of private users. For instance, the ’READ CONTACTS’ permission, which
grants the application access to user’s contacts stored on the device, is categorized
as dangerous permission. Static features that correspond to the total number of
the normal/signature/dangerous permissions required by the application can
also be specified in the feature vector. For example, a version of the Arspam
Android Trojan malware that promotes a form of political activism3 named
Alsalah cf rm renaming 4 requests a very large number of permissions, part of
which are shown in Figure 3.2. Many of these permissions are used to propagate
the malware to people on the compromised user’s contact list.
• Activity Activities incorporate an Android application’s interactive interface
and are defined in the manifest file as well. In order to show whether they are
2

https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#
regular-dangerous
3
More detail on Arspam can be found at:
https://androidcommunity.com/
android-arspam-is-the-latest-malware-threat-says-symantec-20111230/
4
More
details
on
VirusTotal
through
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/
0a0ff315ef11478fc3f8e08af7312f05430c6a977f246df8224b812c948c7056/detection.
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Figure 3.2: Permissions requested from the malware sample Alsalah cf rm renaming

used or not, a collection of binary features can be generated for each activity.
Also, a potential feature is the total number of activities. As we can see from
the screenshot, for example, Figure 3.1, Zsone 245 contains activities such as
hiding the keyboard.
• Services In order to promote the interaction between the application and the
system and also with other applications, services are used to execute long-running
background operations. We can specify a binary feature (used or not) for each
service, in the same way as with activities. In addition, it is also possible to
define basic count and advanced statistical features based on that. Figure 3.3
displays a portion of the trojan malware sample manifest file test.txt 5 . In its
manifest, this malware application has 3 separate services, 2 of which are seen
in the figure, i.e., line 52 and line 79 of the file.
• Content Provider To encapsulate data and supply it to other applications, a
content provider is defined and used. It is also possible to specify binary features
and statistical features for providers in a way that is close to that mentioned
5

Further details of the malware can be found from https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/
0a0fa3a704aa8e65afe72693de2634edbcf2f97c66ccb03821d9cba89c77cc73/detection
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Figure 3.3: The manifest of a trojan malware sample test.txt showing activities, receivers, services
etc.

above. For example, to decide what content providers exist and how many are
utilized by the application.
• Broadcast Receiver This part of an application requires intents from the
device or other applications to be obtained. It is also possible to specify binary
features and statistical features for providers in a way that is close to that
mentioned above. Some of the receiver examples are seen in Figure 3.3. For
example, the receiver in Lines 66 — 70 shows that after booting, the application
will receive the intent sent by the system.
• Intent Filters In order to determine what kind of operations they should react
to, activities and services involve intents. Intents determine what broadcast
they should accommodate. Similarly, it is possible to derive binary features and
statistical features for intent. Some examples of filter intents are seen in Figures
3.1 and 3.3. Lines 68, for instance, suggests that the application requests a
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”BOOT COMPLETE” intent, i.e. that the booting mechanism is complete.
• API calls These consist of a collection of application programming interface
(API) packages for developers to construct applications is provided by the official
Android framework. For certain API packages and their classes specified in
the source code, binary or integer features can be extracted. In the following
chapter, we include a thorough introduction to API features as they are used
to create more advanced features. For example, the malware sample Zsone 245
called android.hardware.fingerprint API as shown in Figure 3.4.
• Hardware One or more hardware components of Android devices might be used
for Android applications. Sensors such as the phone’s camera, GPS, and speaker
provide such hardware components. It is likely that this detail is declared in the
manifest file, although that is not necessarily the case. Some applications can
require these permissions in the app’s source code instead of in the manifest file.
The associated feature set is called using the format ” hardware:NAME ” with ”
NAME ” replaced with the name of the hardware component. Hardware featureassociated permissions can be coded as binary features with a 1 denoting that
the application uses the corresponding hardware component and a 0 implying
that it does not. Similarly, to describe a static feature, the number of such
hardware permissions required can also be used. Zsone 245 requires access to
a number of hardware components (including fingerprint as shown in Figure
3.4) of the Android device without the permissions declared in the manifest file.
Instead, from the source code, we find those specifications.
• Network elements Numerous network components, e.g. IP addresses, URLs,
and hostnames, can be used in an android application. To produce binary
features and statistical features, these elements are obtained from the source
code (e.g., the number of hostnames that are listed in the file). Figure 3.5
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Figure 3.4: Screenshot of the API information of the malware sample Zsone 245

suggests that the Zsone 245 malware sample contains a malicious URL that
is used to view photos such that advertising revenue can be obtained from ad
clicks developed by the malware developers.

Section 3.2

Dynamic Features
Android applications reveal their run-time behavior in dynamic analysis. A controlled and isolated environment called a sandbox6 used for running potential harmful
applications.
In order to dynamically analyze an Android application, we mount the application
in a sandbox environment first. To replicate the use of the application on real devices
by real users, a sequence of commands is then sent to the sandbox environment. In
order to recognize the operations that are thereby activated in the application, for
example, the system can be rebooted.
6

There is a range of sandboxes for Android applications to deter harmful applications causing
possible damage to other applications or the device during the execution of the potential harmful
app. Two common sandboxes, Droidbox https://github.com/pjlantz/droidbox and Cuckoo
https://cuckoosandbox.org/.
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Figure 3.5: Part of the source code of the malware sample Zsone 245 containing a url

Usually, we run the application for a fixed time window inside the sandbox (e.g. 2 10 minutes) and save the log/trace of the activity of the application, providing a list of
all device processes, connections/calls to other systems, as well as the expected network
interactions. In order to produce dynamic features, we then extract information from
the trace. There are many businesses that o↵er facilities in di↵erent sandboxes to test
Android applications and produce reports from their run-time logs. These reports will
then be used for the extraction of dynamic features.
A variety of dynamic features from similar works are briefly presented and discussed
below [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 61, 62].
• Service We can create dynamic features to record each started service with
NAME as ”service:NAME”, and the cumulative number of services started can
also be set as a feature. An n-gram of services is a series of services. One class
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Figure 3.6: Services started by Plankton in Droidbox

of dynamic features shares one feature with each n-gram of services. Given
a n gram s1, . . . , sn of services, we can record whether this sequence is ever
invoked in the runtime execution of the code. Figure 3.6 shows that a malware
sample named Plankton 7 is executed in Droidbox. It begins the notification
service on two di↵erent occasions within 0.01 second. Plankton is secret spyware
that extracts information from the user’s internet browser, including bookmarks,
search history, and passwords.
• Dexclass DexClassLoader is a public class used to load classes from every form
of .jar, .zip, and .application bundles. Malicious applications can run code on
a user’s device without being installed as part of the application. Whenever
the class loader DexClassLoader is called to load a class, a dynamic feature
”dexclass:NAME” can be generated. Similarly, statistical features and n gram
based features can be created. Figure 4 shows that Plankton use DexClassLoader
to load classes from input.jar.
• Permissions Although Android applications must specifically declare the permissions they request in their manifest file, Android applications can still attempt
to bypass this requirement in di↵erent ways[69]. The easiest approach is to use
7

More details can be found on VirusTotal via https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/
00ceaa5f8f9be7a9ce5ffe96b5b6fb2e7e73ad87c2f023db9fa399c40ac59b62/detection
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Figure 3.7: Dexclass called by Plankton in Droidbox

Figure 3.8: Permission required by Plankton in Droidbox

the ”convert channel” to exchange information between di↵erent applications.
The circumvented permissions are monitored and features ”permission:NAME”
are created. As in the previous situations, statistical features and n gram based
features can be created. Figure 3.8 presents part of the permissions requested
by the Plankton malware while running in Droidbox.
• Dataleaks The operations conducted by an application could contribute to the
user’s personal data being exposed. Such actions may be documented to create
features such as ”dataleaks:CONTENT”. Figure 3.9 indicates that a device’s
IMEI details may be leaked.
• Crypto Also, we can connect a feature that monitors the success of private
encryption keys in Android applications. If an application encrypts files and
saves them in a sandbox, the device monitors and documents them. These
features are used to create dynamic, content-specific cryptographic features in
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Figure 3.9: Dataleaks of Plankton in Droidbox

Figure 3.10: Recvnet operation by Plankton in Droidbox

the format ”crypto:CONTENT”.
• Opennet/Closenet The socket related features maintain records of where and
how sockets are opened and closed. We may call the destination host either
”opennet:DEST” or ”closenet:PORT”.
• Recvnet This set of features help maintain track of the data collected from the
network(”recvnet:CONTENT”) and the origins of the data(”recvnet:FROM”).
One of the recvnet activities of the Plankton malware is shown in Figure 3.10.
• Sendnet This set of features maintain the track of how the application sends
(”sendnet:CONTENT”) and received information. The destination (”send-
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Figure 3.11: Sendnet operation by Plankton in Droidbox

Figure 3.12: Receive actions by Plankton in Droidbox

net:DEST”) is also recorded which can later be extracted as dynamic features.
One of the recvnet activities of the Plankton malware is shown in Figure 3.11.
• Sendsms We will document the name of the receiver of messages and their
content in situations where applications send messages out when they are
operating. Records of ”sendsms:NUM” and ”sendsms:MESSAGE” are generated
as dynamic features to collect related information.
• Phonecall Malicious Android applications occasionally make phone calls (e.g.
to premium-rate numbers). When specifying features such as ”phonecall:NUM”,
we save the telephone number of the called number.
• Recvsaction It is also possible to catch the list of intents the application
refers to during execution as dynamic features. Two intents associated with the
Plankton malware are captured and shown in Figure 3.12.
• Library This documents the features associated with the application’s library
directories, referred to as ”library:NAME” features.
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Figure 3.13: One of the file read and write operations by Plankton in Droidbox

• Read/Write The endpoint and the content will be captured while the application reads or writes individual files. Then we create the ”read:DEST”,
”write:DEST”, ”read:CONTENT” and ”write:CONTENT” features. Figure 3.13
presents one file read operation of Plankton in Droidbox after the application
has run for 3.91 seconds.
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Chapter 4

Advanced Features of Android
Applications
In this thesis, the advanced machine learning algorithms we use to identify between
benign and malicious Android applications all associate a ”feature vector” with each
Android application. We implement four new types of features (Triadic Suspicion
Graph based Features in Section 4.2, Landmark-based Features in Section 4.3, Feature
clustering-based Features in Section 4.4, Correlation Graph based Feature Transformation in Section 4.5) in this chapter, in addition to the typical types of static and
dynamic features used in past work and defined in Chapter 3.

Section 4.1

API Features
An applicaton programming interface (API) for an application is a collection of
subroutine definitions, communication protocols, and software construction methods. There is a collection of API packages for Android apps that developers can
use to access a variety of useful functionalities. The API Package, for instance,
android.accessibilityservice can build accessibility services that provide up-
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dates to the user. A variety of classes are included in each API package and each class
has its own methods that execute various functions.
API packages are not totally independent, which ensures that by calling classes
and methods from other API packages, they can communicate with each other. For
instance, the android.provider API package invokes classes from the android.view
package.
The Android API (level 23) includes 171 [70] various API packages. The 171 dimensional
feature vector f~ is designed for each Android app to capture the frequency at which
that application calls methods from each API package. Each f i 2 f~ unit represents
the number of method calls made to methods in the ith API package in the source
code of that program. Through evaluating the app’s source code, we obtain the
feature values. For example, if the ith API package contains 40 methods (belonging
to separate classes) and each of them is called by an app twice, then 80 will be the
corresponding feature value of f i.
An application’s API feature values will di↵er greatly. Consider a goodware sample
named OptiLife 2.8.31 . For instance, when considering a goodware sample (i.e.
a regular Android program without malicious behavior), the highest value function
has a 389, 204 value, while the smallest feature has a 0 value among all the 171 API
features associated with OptiLife 2.8.3. On this one application only, the standard
deviation of feature values is as high as 32, 333.47.
Conversely, for other applications, the distribution of API feature values can be
very di↵erent. For example, another sample of goodware called Hancom Office 20142
has the largest API value of 6 and the smallest of 0, with a standard deviation of only
0.61.
1
2

SHA256: 0e425318be9↵aea9833307023162b4c7c3d5ccf97adf83b0eb0e4127bb89929
SHA256: 75d1ad83a77d1d66d17586d7f83cb4c56e136b5cc63fe002f55f55f434819b162
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Section 4.2

Triadic Suspicion Graph based Features
In this section, we present a novel set of features that I have invented based on a
special class of graphs first defined in [71].
4.2.1. Triadic Suspicion Graph
The notion of a Triadic Suspicion Graph (TSG) is based on API features and will be
used to describe a collection of novel features shortly.
The fundamental concept behind a TSG is to consider the di↵erences between
goodware’s use of API package calling behavior and various types of malware’s usage
of API package.
Suppose A is the set of all API package calls defined within the Android API, G is a
set of Android goodware, and B is some type of malware we interested in (in subsequent
chapters, these additional types of malware will include spyware, ransomware, banking
trojans, and more). Note that both B, G are samples that are randomly drawn from
the set of malware of interest and the set of goodware. We use TSGG,B to denote
the triadic suspicion graph associated with G and B. The triadic suspicious graph
contains three kinds of vertices: API package calls of set A, goodware drawn from the
set G and malware from the set B. The edges of TSGG,B are defined as follows:
(a) For each goodware g in G and each API package call a in A, if g calls a method
from a at least for once, then there is an edge from g to a.
(b) For each pair of API package calls a1 and a2 in A, if a1 calls any method from
a2 , there is an edge from a1 to a2 .
(c) For each malware b in set B and each API package call a in A, if b calls any
method from a at least once, we add an edge from b to a.
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We do not require that G and B be fixed. A system security analyst might use G1
and B1 in one week, switch to G2 and B2 the next week, and keep doing so regularly
in order to present a “moving target” defense. Varying the sets G and B changes the
attack surface adjusts and thereby makes it difficult for the adversary to presume
or speculate too much about the defense’s exact nature. Furthermore, we suggest
keeping the size of G and B relatively small. For example, if there are 1M goodware
samples and 10K malware samples in total, we might select only say 1K samples for
each of G and B one week, 1.5k the next week, 2k the third week, and so forth. By
frequently modifying the sizes and samples in G and B, the defender is keeping the
attacker continuously guessing about the nature of the defenses being used.
Once the vertices and edges in a TSG are determined, we additionally allow
the edges to be weighted by a weight function w. For any edge from an application
v 2 G [B to an API package call a 2 A, we use f (v, a) to denote the frequency (number
of times) that v calls methods from a (which is also the corresponding API feature
value). Equations (4.1) to (4.5) demonstrate 5 plausible definitions of weight functions
w. It is easy to see that Equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) respectively represent linear,
quadratic and cubic relationships between the API package call frequency and the
edge weight; meanwhile, Equations (4.4) and (4.5) capture other possible non-linear
relationships. The intuition behind these di↵erent definitions is that most machine
learning algorithms are very sensitive to the input features and cannot always correctly
infer the best non-linear relationships using the modeling framework alone. We set
the weight of edges between pairs of API package calls to the same default value (e.g.,
1). The reason is that we are more interested in whether a specific edge exists, rather
than the frequency with which one API package calls the another within the Android
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API as this is controlled by Google’s Android team and not by malicious hackers.

w1 (v, a) = f (v, a)

(4.1)

w2 (v, a) = f (v, a)2

(4.2)

w3 (v, a) = f (v, a)3
p
w4 (v, a) = f (v, a)

(4.3)
(4.4)

w5 (v, a) = ln f (v, a) + 1

(4.5)

We use TSGG,B,w to denote the triadic suspicion graph that is generated using
B, G and the weight function w.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates part of a TSG built with some goodware samples, a set of
banking trojans and the weight function w1 in Equation (4.1). 3 goodware samples
(Perfect Girls3 , Azerbaijan Radio World4 and Iberia Perseo5 ), 3 banking trojan samples (Regon6 , Marcher7 and Fakebank8 ) and 4 API packages (android.view,
java.net, android.app.admin and java.util) are shown in the figure (in this scenario, the full TSG will contain all the package calls present in the Android API
and potentially a lot more samples of goodware and banking trojan samples). The
Goodware

Perfect Girls

Azerbaijan
Radio World

2405
142
27
53
4
241 124
429
2
2
73
53
1685

Banking trojans

android.view

35

Regon

1

java.net

605

2
android.app.admin
java.util

2
11

10
8
1545

479
32
12

Iberia Perseo

API packages

Marcher

Fakebank

Figure 4.1: Illustration of TSG
3
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SHA256:
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SHA256:
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SHA256:
4

00061593f5b0299bd46cce5c1dba502319c8274ba8c206d7abc0b59d7b23ab7e
000f966c1af8eaacf8f23ba39074ee5964243a839382ae9683e5d1062521f240
0019fd007c1427d57c1ec96ecdfde546c725e8e4297a10c8b495be7e2a061fc4
0007c43e45430610fb0e933545bd927d9c8078380aaa0a518ce807bb9e098903
0010cc30886b77d922de3230a0df16de11463b5be79ce4a0d5cd26d655be0348
002ef1caca9d5e567660e6f6001d39863c526bfa292a764↵241c08503956fb2
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edges from Android applications to API packages are represented with gray arrows,
where the numbers denote the number of times that they call the corresponding API
package’s methods (i.e., this number is the same as its corresponding API feature
value defined previously in Section 4.1). Green arrows in the figure show the calling
relationship amongst pairs of API packages. As we observe, none of the 3 goodware
samples call the API package android.app.admin, while 2 out of the 3 banking
trojans call it a few times. The intuition behind our work is that this pattern might
be relevant in distinguishing goodware from banking trojans.
We now define a set of novel features based on TSGs.
4.2.2. Suspicion Score
With the TSG defined, we now introduce the concept of suspicion score (SUS) of
API packages in A. The idea is that an API package that is frequently invoked by
malware but not by goodware is more suspicious than one that is frequently invoked
by goodware, but not by malware. We do not claim that suspicion scores alone are
enough to predict whether an Android application is malicious or not, just that it
provides a set of features of interest.
First, we introduce an indicator function I(v1 , v2 ) to denote the existence of an
edge from vertex v1 to v2 , where v1 , v2 2 A [ G [ B. In other words, if it is the case
that f (v1 , v2 ) > 0, then I(v1 , v2 ) = 1, otherwise it is 0. Actually, I(v, a) for edges
from benign/malicious applications to API packages can be treated as another kind of
weight function w0 (v, p) = 1 if f (v, a) > 0 else 0. In the following we use n to denote
|B| and m to denote |G|. We list 12 definitions of SUS (Equations (4.6) to (4.17)).
The reason for multiple definitions is that each of these definitions represents one way
of defining suspicion levels. By defining multiple candidates, we are less worried about
over-fitting a predefined model. Moreover, using these 12 suspicion score definitions
and other features as input, machine learning techniques can tell us which suspicion
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scores are best able to di↵erentiate benign applications from malicious ones.
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It is easy to see that the di↵erent definitions of SUS are closely related to the
weight functions (w0 to w5 ). We discuss a couple of these suspicion scoring functions
below. For example, the first SUS definition in Equation (4.6) basically means that
the suspicious score of the API package aj is decided by the ratio of the percentage
of malware applications in B that call it to the sum of the percentage of malware
applications in B that call it and the percentage of benign applications in G that call
it. Meanwhile, the SUS definition in Equation (4.12) takes Ratio B — the ratio of
the number of malicious applications in B that invoke aj to the sum of the number of
malicious applications that invokes each API packages divided by the sum of Ratio
B and Ratio G — the ratio of the number of benign applications in G that invoke aj
to the sum of the number of benign applications that invokes each API packages, as
the suspicious score of the API package aj . Equations (4.12) to (4.17) are respectively
similar to equations (4.6) to (4.11) except that the suspicion score of one API package
is evaluated w.r.t. all API packages rather than itself alone.
4.2.3. Suspicion Rank
Furthermore, inspired by the definition of PageRank9 [72], we define a concept —
suspicion rank SR(a) for an Android API package a w.r.t. a suspicion scoring function
9

PageRank is a mechanism to capture the importance of webpages using the formula P R(v) =
P
R(u)
+ d ⇥ (u,v)2E Pout(u)
, where E is the set of edges in the web, N is the total number of nodes
in the web, d 2 [0, 1] is called the “damping factor” and is usually set to 0.85, and out(u) is the
out-degree of node u. The 1Nd expression captures the probability that a user will reach webpage v
P
R(u)
directly (e.g., by typing it in explicitly into a browser) while the d ⇥ (u,v)2E Pout(u)
is intended to
capture the probability of a user reaching page v by following links.
1 d
N
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sus as Equation (4.18). The parameter
PageRank. In practice, we set

2 [0, 1] is a “damping factor” similar to d of

= 0.85 as is usually done with PageRank. Besides,

out(a0 ) is the out-degree of API package a0 in T SGB,G,w (i.e., the number of API
packages invoked by a0 ). Note that only API packages a0 that invoke a are taken into
consideration in calculating a’s suspicious rank (SR).

SRsus (a) =

1
+ ·
|A|

X

a0 2A,(a0 ,a)2E

sus(a0 ) · SRsus (a0 )
out(a0 )

Note that the SUS function sus(a0 ) in the above equation defining SR can be any of
Equations (4.6) to (4.17). Therefore, it is noteworthy that SR is obviously di↵erent
from PageRank — instead of one definition, SR has a family of 12 di↵erent definitions,
each corresponding to one definition of SUS.
Since SUS is a measure defined for API packages on the complete T SGB,G,w , and
the sets B and G are, in some sense, dynamic, SUS and SR would vary accordingly
when security analysts update the members of B and G.
The definition of SR mainly relies on a sub-graph structure of T SGB,G,w , i.e., the
sub-graph with vertices in the set A of API packages and the edges among them. We
name this sub-graph “The Android API package call graph (APCG for short)” and
provide more discussion on it in the rest of this section.
The sub-graph APCG of the triadic suspicious graph only depends on the set A of
API packages [70] and the mutual calling behavior among them. Thus the structure of
the APCG is independent of the choice of applications in the sets B and G. In other
words, irrespective of how B, G, w are chosen, the APCG part of T SGB,G,w of di↵erent
B, G, w would remain unchanged. There is no possibility for adversaries to manipulate
the APCG. This property makes it di↵erent from existing works with function call
graphs.
Function call graphs in existing works, like dependency graphs [73], control-flow
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graphs [74, 9] and code property graphs [75] usually rely on specific application samples
and depend on the sequence of operations within the applications. In other words,
prior works abstract per-app function call graphs, which are then used by detection
models to identify the similarity among applications. In contrast, we build the APCG
based on the universal API packages without touching any specific applications, then
a single large TSG graph (Figure 4.1) is developed on the basis of the APCG with
additional sets B and G of applications. This TSG is further used to derive a family of
SUS and SR for each API package in the APCG. We can then generate TSG features
according to API packages’ SUS and SR for any Android app, irrespective of whether
it is a member of B [ G or not. One single graph for all applications as compared to
one graph per app significantly improves efficiency and generality.
Recall that we have previously recommended that the sets B and G should be
dynamically changed over time. Because of this, our proposed approach also possesses
the advantage of establishing a “moving target” defense [76].
4.2.4. Window-based TSG Feature Creator
The preceding two sections define SUS and SR for API packages in triadic suspicious
graph. Clearly, there are in total 12 + 12 = 24 kinds of suspicion-based scores
associated with each API package.
In the next step, we use the suspicion-based scores derived from a TSG to generate
what we call “TSG features” for Android applications. One thing to note is that TSG
features are used to capture the API package call behavior of applications, and the
application does not have to be in either the set B or the set G to have TSG features.
We use ⇢ to represent a SUS score function or a SR rank function. The API
packages in A are ranked in descending order according to their scores returned by
the function ⇢. One way to think about the ranked API packages is that the higher
rank of the API package, the more suspicious it is. However, we probably have noise
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(which might come from the choice of sample applications in sets B, G) in computing
SUS or SR for API packages. Therefore, instead of directly using the ranked API
package list, we apply a window-based segmentation on the list before deriving TSG
features.
The basic idea of window-based segmentation is to use an integer W > 1 as the
window size and segment the list into a number d |A|
e of buckets starting from the
W
beginning of the list. As shown in Figure 4.2, each bucket (except possibly the last
one) has W API packages with similar suspicion-based score or rank.

Figure 4.2: Window-based API package ranking by descending SUS/SR scores.

Recall that we define a |A|-dimensional API feature vector f~ in Section 4.1 for
each application to capture its basic API package call behavior. Now for each Android
app, we define a d |A|
e-dimensional TSG feature vector f~tsg according to f~ and the
W
suspicion of API packages. Assume that API packages a1 , . . . , aW are in the same
bucket, the corresponding API feature values of an application are f1 , . . . , fW , the
corresponding TSG feature for this bucket is then calculated via one of the following
6 methods:
(a) (Binary Value) Does this application call any API packages from this bucket?
P
This binary feature is 1 if W
j=1 fj > 0, else 0.

(b) (# of API Packages) How many API packages in this bucket are called by the
P
app? The feature value is an integer W
j=1 I(fj ), where function I(fj ) = 1 if
fj > 0, else 0.

(c) (Max) Among the call frequencies (the number of calling times) from the
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application to all API packages in the bucket, what is the maximum value? The
feature value is an integer maxW
j=1 fj .
(d) (Median) Among the call frequencies, what is the median? The feature value is
an integer medianW
j=1 fj .
(e) (FreqSum) How many times in total does this application call API packages in
P
this bucket? The feature value is an integer W
j=1 fj .

(f) (WtSum) Based on FreqSum, what would be the value if we take the suspiciousscore given by function ⇢ as the corresponding weight? This feature is a real
P
value W
j=1 ⇢j fj , where ⇢j stands for the suspicious-score of API package aj .

To illustrate how this works, consider the small dataset with 3 banking trojans
and 3 goodware samples in Figure 4.1. Suppose the table below shows the frequency
with which the malware sample Regon calls the 4 API packages shown in Figure 4.1.

Freq.

android.view

java.net

android.app.admin

java.util

35

0

1

112

Suppose we use Equation (4.6) as our suspicion scoring method. In this case, the
suspicion scores (after sorting in descending order) are given by the table:

SUS

android.app.admin

android.view

java.util

java.net

1

0.5

0.5

0.25

Suppose we now use W = 2 as the window size. In this case, there are two buckets
— the first bucket has android.app.admin and android.view in it and the second
has java.util and java.net in it. So the feature values for the banking trojan
Regon obtained from the first bucket are: Binary Value = 1, # of API Packages = 2,
FreqSum = 36, Max = 35, Median = 18, and WtSum = 1 ⇥ 1 + 0.5 ⇥ 35 = 18.5.
The values of these features generated by the second bucket are 1, 1, 112, 112, 56, 56
respectively. Of course, this is a toy example that considers just 4 packages in the
Android API instead of all 171.
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Now suppose we repeat this process with Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.18). In
this case, our table of suspicion ranks after sorting:
java.util

java.net

android.view

android.app.admin

0.1025

0.0811

0.0375

0.0375

SR

So the feature values for banking trojan Regon obtained from the first bucket are:
Binary Value = 1, # of API Packages = 1, FreqSum = 112, Max = 112, Median = 56,
and WtSum = 0.1025⇥112+0.0811⇥0 = 11.48. Of the API calls in the second bucket,
Regon has corresponding feature values 1, 2, 36, 35, 18 and 0.0375 ⇥ (35 + 1) = 1.35.
The above discussion about generating TSG features for the malware application
Regon based on a sub-set of API packages and a part of the complete TSG illustrates
how to generate TSG features for any Android application. In practice, there are
171 API packages, 24 di↵erent kinds of suspicious-score functions ⇢, 6 methods to
compute TSG features for each ⇢. As a result, for any given app, we can generate
24 ⇥ 6 ⇥ d 171
e-dimensional TSG features with a given W . For example, if we take
W
W = 10, there would be 2, 592 TSG features for any app. Under this circumstance,
W is a controllable parameter for security analysts. In addition, an analyst may use
the same window size or di↵erent window sizes over the ranked API package list.
For instance, if there are 4 sorted API packages corresponding to suspicious-scores
{0.9, 0.3, 0.29, 0.2} given by ⇢: (1) using unified window-size W = 2, they can be
segmented into two buckets with {0.9, 0.3}, {0.29, 0.2}; (2) with diverse window-size
~ = {1, 3}, they can be segmented into two buckets with {0.9}, {0.3, 0.29, 0.2}. The
W
rest procedures of deriving TSG features would remain the same.

Section 4.3

Landmark-based Features
We propose a set of features for Android applications based on landmarks in this
section. The motivation comes from the fact that landmarks are frequently used and
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referred to by human beings consciously or unconsciously in daily life. Suppose you
are considering buying a house in someplace (e.g., Boston). The price of the house (in
your mind) would likely depend upon several factors, one of which could be the sale
price of some other houses, for example, another house with similar size and age in
the same area. These houses used as reference houses are landmarks. The comparison
between di↵erent houses provides you with some insight into the value of houses for
the type of house of interest to you.
We would like to similarly adopt the idea of using landmarks in defining a new
feature space for Android applications. Suppose there is a set D of Android applications
(including both benign and malicious ones), where each application i 2 D has a feature
vector f~i . We first select a subset L of samples from D and set them as landmarks,
then define new features for each application i 2 D w.r.t. each landmark in L.
4.3.1. Landmark Selection
We first want to emphasize that the applications in D can either be goodware or
malware and whether it has a known label or not does not matter. The number of
landmarks NL to be selected should be decided in advance by the analyst. We suggest
keeping the size of L small. For example, if there are 1M samples in set D, a selection
of NL = 1K might be considered. In this case, it is hard for adversaries to guess the
selected landmarks, let alone the landmark-based features. We propose 3 methods for
selecting the set L of landmarks from D.
S1 - Random selection. Regardless of the feature vectors {f~i }i2D , a basic and
naive landmark selection method is to randomly select NL applications from D as
landmarks.
S2 - clustering-based selection. The applications in D are firstly clustered into
NL groups. There are many well-studied algorithms for clustering and we consider 6
commonly used ones:
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(a) k-means clustering;
(b) k-median clustering;
(c) mean-shift clustering;
(d) DBSCAN (density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise);
(e) expectation–maximization clustering using Gaussian mixture models;
(f) agglomerative hierarchical clustering.
Each clustering algorithm has its own benefits and drawbacks. They may also perform
di↵erently due to the characteristics of the dataset D. Without previous knowledge
of the applications’ feature distribution, we are not going to claim which clustering
algorithm is the optimal one. After the applications in D are clustered into NL groups,
we then select one from each of them as the landmarks. The selection within each
group can either be (1) randomized or (2) centroid-based. As a result, for landmark
selection method S2, there are actually 6 ⇥ 2 ways to realize it even without counting
the variability in hyper-parameters that some of the clustering and other methods use
internally.
S3 - Max-distance heuristic selection. Algorithm 1 shows an algorithm for
selecting landmarks that are scattered across the basic feature space. Except for the
set D and the number of landmarks NL to select, we need another input, i.e., the
distance function d(·), which is used to evaluate the distance between two application
samples regarding their feature vectors. We consider 4 kinds of distance functions:
(a) Euclidean distance;
(b) Manhattan distance;
(c) Cosine distance;
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(d) Hamming distance.
This algorithm starts by randomly choosing an application from D as a landmark
and then iteratively adds more landmarks. In each iteration, a set of applications
is randomly drawn from D

L0 (where L0 is the current set of selected landmarks)

and the point that is “furthest away” (in terms of the sum/minimum/median of
its distance, Line 1) from the set L0 is the next choice. The process ends when NL
landmarks have been picked. As a result, for landmark selection method S3, there
are actually 4 ⇥ 3 ways (4 distance function and 3 kinds of definitions for “furthest”)
to realize it.
Algorithm 1 Max-Distance Heuristic Landmark Selection
Input: Set D of applications, distance function d(·), NL
Output: Set L of landmarks
Initialize: L0
Randomly select an application from D
0
While |L | < NL do
R = a set of applications
randomly drawn from D L0
P
Best = arg maxr2R `2L d(`, r)
L0
L0 [ {Best}
Return: L
L0
In total, there are 1 + 12 + 12 = 25 ways to select the set L of landmarks from the
set D for each NL value.
However, to further confound the adversary, the security researchers may periodically (e.g. once a week) either use a new set of landmarks or modify the landmark
selection method, or both and recompute landmark-based features. By doing so, the
adversary is kept guessing in the spirit of “moving target” defense[76].
4.3.2. Landmark-based Feature Generation
We use the selected landmarks in set L to compute landmark-based features for each
application sample i in set D. First, we compute the distance d(i, `) of sample i to
each ` 2 L, then its NL dimensional landmark-based feature vector is constructed by
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using the distances {d(i, `)}. As in the case of landmark selection method S3, we use
4 di↵erent distance functions.
Algorithm 2 presents the whole procedure of generating landmark-based features.
We input the set D of Android applications with their feature vectors F = {f~i }i2D ,
the number NL of landmarks to select, the landmark selection method S and its
parameters if applicable and the distance function d(·). First, we generate the set L
of landmarks with S; then iteratively compute the landmark feature vectors for each
sample application i 2 D.
Algorithm 2 Generating LM features
Input: D, F = {f~i }i2D (basic feature vectors for samples in D), NL (the number of
landmarks to select), landmark selection method S and distance function d(·)
Output: landmark-based feature vector f~ilm for each i 2 D
Initialize: L
S
For each sample application i 2 D do
For each landmark ` 2 L do
Compute d(i, `);
Return: f~ilm = {d(i, `)}`2L
Figure 4.3 is a simple illustration of landmark features. Suppose there are 6
samples in set D, each with 4 dimensional API feature vector (values as the shown in
Figure 4.1). 2 (Perfect Girls and Marcher) of the 6 samples are randomly selected
as landmarks (with S1) in set L. Landmark features are generated with the Euclidean
distance function. From the figure, we can see the Euclidean distance from each
sample application i 2 D to each landmark. The landmark-based feature vector for
Regon is then h3551.33, 677.93i, while that for Perfect Girls is h0, 2903.66i.

Section 4.4

Feature clustering-based Features
We propose another approach to generate transformed features based on feature
clustering. The intuition behind this approach is that some features may share
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of landmark-based features with 6 applications, 2 landmarks and the Euclidean
distance function.

similarities and demonstrate similar relationships with the label to predict. In this
case, we can combine those similar features together, and thus create a smaller but
perhaps more representative set of new features. The approach first clusters the set of
basic features into a number of groups then derives aggregated features in each group.
We call these features FC features for short.
Algorithm 3 presents the method we use to get FC features. The inputs consist of
the set D of all Android applications, each with their n dimensional basic feature
vector10 , the number G of clusters to divide n features, Clu the clustering algorithm,
and

the algorithm to aggregate features within one group. First, we extract a subset

D0 of sample applications from D and use their feature values to cluster the n features
into G groups. Note that a subset of D instead of itself is used for feature clustering.
The reason is three-fold: first, the dataset D might be huge and hence clustering the
dataset might be very expensive; second, by using a subset of samples for clustering, we
make it harder for the adversary to figure out the feature clustering result; and third,
when the set D is extended with more applications, the corresponding FC features
of the new applications can be computed without having to re-run Algorithm 3 and
re-clustering basic features. Then the FC features are computed for each application
in the set D w.r.t. each group of features and the associative and commutative feature
10
In practice, we use API features (Section 4.1) as the basic features. This is optional and our
approach can work on other selected basic features in similar procedures.
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aggregate algorithm

to 3.

Algorithm 3 Generating FC features
Input: D, F = {fij }i2D,1jn , G: number of clusters desired, Clu a clustering
algorithm, associative and commutative feature aggregate algorithm
Output: f~if c = {figf c }1gG for each i 2 D
Initialize: D0
take a subset of samples from D
F0
get the feature matrix for samples in D0
Cluster the n basic features into G groups according to column vectors {fij }i2D0 in F 0
matrix with Clu
For each sample application i 2 D do
For each feature group Fg do
figf c = {fij | j 2 Fg }
fc
Return: f~if c = (fi1f c , · · · , fiG
)

4.4.1. Clustering and Feature Aggregation
Clustering: Similar to landmark selection method S2, we consider 6 clustering methods
(k-means/median clustering, mean-shift clustering, DBSCAN, EM clustering using
GM models and agglomerative hierarchical clustering) as candidates of Clu.
Feature aggregation: According to algorithm 3, the set {fij | j 2 Fg } of feature
values for the application i and the features clustered into group Fg are extracted
according to the basic feature vector f~i . Then an associative and commutative
combination operator
feature

is applied on the set to aggregate them and generate a FC

{fij | j 2 Fg }. There are numerous options for

, some of our consideration

are listed below.
(a) (Product) The new feature is computed as the product of elements in the set,
Q
i.e., figf c = j2Fg fij .

(b) (Mean) The mean value of the set of values is used as the new feature value:
figf c = meanj2Fg fij .
(c) (Median) The mean value of the set of values is used as the new feature value:
figf c = medianj2Fg fij .
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(d) (Sum) The new feature is computed as the sum of elements in the set: figf c =
P
j2Fg fij .

(e) (WtSum) The new feature is computed as the weighted sum of elements in the
set. The weight of feature j is inverse proportional to the distance between
the feature j’s vector {fij }i2D0 and the centroid feature of the group jc ’s vector
P
{fijc }i2D0 , which is denoted as d(j, jc ). Thus figf c = ↵ j2Fg fij ⇥ e d(j,jc ) where
↵ is the parameter for normalization. Note that we try all distance measures
stated for landmark selection method S3 for function d(j, jc ).
Note that the G dimensional FC features are transformed from a n dimensional

basic feature vector for each Android app. Usually, we select a G to be much smaller
than n, so that the feature space dimension would decrease dramatically. For instance,
if the basic feature vector has 100 elements, and G is set as 8, then the FC feature
vector for application i would be {fi1 , . . . , fi8 }. This FC feature vector is supposed to
be highly representative. Meanwhile, they are hard to guess for adversaries, since in the
process of generating FC features, security analysts have to make several key choices.
These choices inject considerable uncertainty for the adversary and make it difficult
for him to reverse-engineer the feature space. These choices include: (1) the selection
of D0 ⇢ D; (2) the number G of clusters to generate; (3) the clustering method Clu
and its hyper-parameters; (4) the aggregation operator
when

and its hyper-parameters

is WtSum.

For the purpose of illustration, our FC feature generation result for a simple
example is also pictorially depicted in Figure 4.4. With the 6 sample applications
and 4 dimensional API features shown in Figure 4.1, suppose that the 4 features are
clustered into 2 groups, and

as the “Mean” approach (item No. 2 as stated above),

we can get the FC features for each application as shown in the right-side table of
Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of FC features with G = 2 groups for 4 dimensional basic API features and
averaging feature aggregation.

Section 4.5

Correlation Graph based Feature Transformation
Similar to the intuition behind feature value clustering-based feature transformation,
we now come to another feature transformation approach that is based on a new
concept called the “correlation graph”. The generated features are called CG features
for short.
Unlike the FC feature transformation, the CG transformation method is based on
a fully connected graph with features as its vertices. The edge between two features
is weighted with the correlation of the values of those features across the space of
Android applications considered. Specifically, for any two features j1 and j2 and a
given set of Android applications, we can get two lists of feature values respectively
with all applications’ feature values of j1 and j2 . The Pearson Correlation Coefficient
cj1 ,j2 is then calculated for this pair of features j1 and j2 . This value cj1 ,j2 is used as
the weight of the edge between features j1 and j2 of the correlation graph.
With the correlation graph of features, we can use community detection techniques
to divide the features into a number of communities such that similar features are in
the same community. We can then associate one feature value for each community.
As shown in Algorithm 4, we would first select a subset D0 of sample applications
from D and get their feature matrix F 0 as discussed for FC features. Then the
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correlation between each pair of features is computed to get the correlation graph,
using which we get G communities with any one of several community detection
algorithms C. Finally, the CG features are generated for each i 2 D w.r.t. features in
each community Cg and the associative and commutative feature aggregation approach
.
Algorithm 4 Generating CG features
Input: D, F = {fij }i2D,1jn , C a community detection algorithm, G desired number
of communities, an associative and commutative operator
Output: F cg = {f~icg | i 2 D} (correlation graph based G-dimensional feature vectors
for sample applications in D)
Initialize: D0
take a subset of samples from D
F0
get the feature matrix for samples in D0
Compute n ⇥ n edge weights of the correlation graph according to column vectors of
F 0 matrix
Get G communities with the n basic features according to the correlation graph and
the community detection algorithm C
For each sample application i 2 D do
For each feature community Cg do
figcg = {fij | j 2 Cg }
cg
Return: f~icg = (fi1cg , · · · , fiG
) CG feature vector for sample i
Similar to FC feature transformation, we have 5 di↵erent ways to define

. As for

the community detection algorithm C, there are multiple options, including:
(a) Minimum-cut method [77];
(b) Hierarchical clustering [78];
(c) Girvan-Newman algorithm [79];
(d) Modularity maximization [80];
(e) Statistical inference [81];
(f) Clique based methods [82].
We note that the CG feature transformation maps each app’s n dimensional basic
feature value to a new and much smaller G dimensional space. In this process, a
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of CG features with 2 communities detected and averaging feature aggregation
method.

number of choices are involved and they inject a great deal of uncertainty for the
adversary who might be attempting to reproduce the CG features. The first choice
is the size of the subset D0 and how to get it. Another choice is which community
detection algorithm to use. A third choice would be the choice of hyper-parameters
used in the community detection algorithm — even if the adversary correctly guessed
the community detection algorithm used, he would still need to guess the hyperparameters used. A final choice would be to guess the feature aggregation approach
within each community (besides using a single
it is also possible to use a di↵erent

operator across all communities,

operator for each community).

Overall, our CG feature generation process consists of many di↵erent choices that
would bring big di↵erences in the final generated CG feature values. Adversaries
will therefore have considerable difficulty in determining how it is implemented in
real-world scenarios.
Figure 4.5 shows an example of correlation graph based features. Recall the
samples and features presented in Figure 4.1. Suppose the 4 API features are in
G = 2 communities as shown in the left-side figure. The CG features for each sample
application while using the “Mean” feature aggregation method are listed in the
right-side table.
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Chapter 5

Detection and Analysis of Android
Malware Families
Section 5.1

DBank: Predictive Behavioral Analysis of
Recent Android Banking Trojans
Dataset. We create our dataset by downloading Android APKs from VirusTotal
during the 2016-2017 time period that were classified as Android Banking Trojans
(referred to as ABTs) by at least 5 antivirus tools. We did the same with goodware (0
detections) and with other types of Android malware (Android malware not identified
as ABT, and with at least 5 antivirus detections).
Table 5.7 summarizes the composition of the dataset. The raw dataset row in
this table shows the number of samples in each category that were downloaded and
successfully dynamically executed on Koodous [43]. However, two samples with
di↵erent file hashes may have the same feature vectors. In this case, we say that these
two samples are isomorphic. Training/testing on the raw dataset would run the risk
of artificially inflating prediction quality because a sample might be in the training

53

Detection and Analysis of Android Malware Families
Table 5.1: Dataset Composition
Raw dataset
No-Isomorphic

Goodware
3,535
2,998

ABT
7,107
1,061

Other Malware
4,478
1,056

set, while an isomorphic copy could also be in the test set. In this case, the problem
of labeling the test example would be unrealistically trivial, leading to an unjustifiable
increase in prediction performance. To avoid this, we build a No-Isomorphic dataset
which retained only one copy of samples that had the same feature vectors.
Classifier training and malware detection. Figure 5.1 shows how to train the
malware classifiers. First, for the set of APK samples, we first extract basic features
as described in Section 4, then we build the API package call graph and the API
features (Section 4.1) are then calculated, based on which the SUS/SR (suspicious
score and suspicious rank, Section 4.2.1) features, LM (landmark based, Section 4.3)
features, FC (feature value clustering based, Section 4.4) features and CG (correlation
graph based, Section 4.5) features are generated and stored.
With a subset of the above-mentioned features of the APK samples, we train the
classifiers with di↵erent classic classifiers, including (1) Bernoulli Naive Bayes, (2)
Random Forest, (3) Logistic regression, (4) SVM, (5) Nearest Neighbors, (6) Gaussian
Naive Bayes, (7) Adaboost, (8) Gradient Boosting Decision Tree and (9) XGBoost.
Two additional techniques, collective classification, and late fusion are employed to
further improve the classifier performance. Specifically, collective classification involves
iterating the training process and late fusion combines multiple classic classifiers
together.
5.1.1. Detection Performance
We are now ready to describe the experiments we conducted to evaluate the performance of DBank using di↵erent combinations of our novel TSG (Section 2) and
traditional features. We followed the usual 10-fold cross-validation protocol. In each
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Classifiers
Features

SUS, SR

Static
APK
samples

LM

Dynamic

FC

API

CG

Bernoulli
Naïve Bayes
Random
Forest

Nearest
Neighbors
Gaussian
Naïve Bayes

Collective
Classification
Classifiers

AdaBoost

Logistic
Regression

Gradient
Boosting DT

SVM

XGB

Late Fusion

Figure 5.1: The training process setup

Table 5.2: Multiple metrics (AUC and F1 etc.) on Android Banking Trojans detection
vs. Goodware No-Isomorphic dataset. Best Late Fusion Parameters: API + S + D:
0.344, TSG: 0.116, LM: 0.105, FC: 0, CG: 0.435.
Datasets

Best Classifier AUC

Precision Recall F1

FPR

FNR

API Package
Static
Dynamic
Static + Dynamic
API + S + D
TSG
Landmark
FC
CG
API + S + D + TSG
API + S + D + Landmark
API + S + D + FC
API + S + D + CG
All features
Best Late Fusion results

XGBoost
XGBoost
MLP
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
KNN
RF
KNN
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost

0.9483
0.9780
0.9242
0.9819
0.9837
0.9463
0.2826
0.9215
0.2617
0.9827
0.9837
0.9827
0.9827
0.9809
0.9905

0.0517
0.0220
0.0758
0.0181
0.0163
0.0537
0.7174
0.0785
0.7383
0.0173
0.0163
0.0173
0.0173
0.0191
0.0095

0.0293
0.0275
0.1107
0.0274
0.0126
0.0300
0.0419
0.0473
0.0000
0.0119
0.0123
0.0126
0.0126
0.0116
0.0093

0.9862
0.9792
0.9215
0.9810
0.9975
0.9872
0.5864
0.9820
0.5101
0.9975
0.9974
0.9975
0.9974
0.9973
0.9982

0.9161
0.9208
0.6550
0.9208
0.9642
0.9142
0.9859
0.8633
1.0000
0.9661
0.9651
0.9642
0.9642
0.9670
0.9736

0.9319
0.9485
0.7667
0.9504
0.9738
0.9300
0.4393
0.8915
0.4148
0.9743
0.9743
0.9734
0.9734
0.9739
0.9819

fold, we split our data into a training set TR and a test set TS. The training set itself
was split into a partial training set PTR and a validation set PVS. The goal was to
optimize parameters using the training set alone (i.e. using PTR to train and PVS to
validate) and then predict on the hold-out (blind) test set.
In the table, S stands for Static; D stands for Dynamic; TSG stands for Triadic
Suspicion Graph; LM stands for Landmark; FC stands for Feature Correlation; CG
stands for Correlation Graph.
In order to evaluate DBank performance in distinguishing between ABTs and
goodware, we tested a suite of 8 classifiers as mentioned above. We also varied the
set of features provided as input to the classifiers in order to understand the impact
of di↵erent feature sets on performance. We consider performance for each of these
feature sets alone, as well as combinations of them.
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Table 5.3: Multiple metrics (AUC and F1 etc.) on Android Banking Trojans detection
vs. Other-malware No-Isomorphic dataset. Best Late Fusion Parameters: API + S
+ D: 0.345, TSG: 0.338, LM: 0.076, FC: 0, CG: 0.241.
Datasets

Best Classifier AUC

Precision Recall F1

FPR

FNR

API Package
Static
Dynamic
Static + Dynamic
API + S + D
TSG
Landmark
FC
CG
API + S + D + TSG
API + S + D + Landmark
API + S + D + FC
API + S + D + CG
All features
Best Late Fusion results

GBDT
XGBoost
MLP
XGBoost
XGBoost
GBDT
XGBoost
XGBoost
SVM
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost
XGBoost

0.8476
0.8513
0.8100
0.8560
0.8794
0.8476
0.5266
0.7588
0.5028
0.8807
0.8815
0.8803
0.8789
0.8827
0.9447

0.1524
0.1487
0.1900
0.1440
0.1206
0.1524
0.4734
0.2412
0.4972
0.1193
0.1185
0.1197
0.1211
0.1173
0.0553

0.1603
0.1592
0.3008
0.1591
0.1214
0.1518
0.3650
0.2363
0.0000
0.1237
0.1179
0.1205
0.1248
0.1210
0.0424

0.9099
0.9156
0.8394
0.9138
0.9447
0.9117
0.5451
0.8409
0.5045
0.9463
0.9444
0.9451
0.9439
0.9476
0.9796

0.8388
0.8401
0.6378
0.8391
0.8794
0.8492
0.8878
0.7681
1.0000
0.8765
0.8831
0.8803
0.8756
0.8794
0.9576

0.8432
0.8456
0.7137
0.8475
0.8794
0.8484
0.6611
0.7635
0.6692
0.8786
0.8823
0.8803
0.8772
0.8810
0.9507

Table 5.2 shows the AUC and FPR of using di↵erent classifiers and feature space
combinations. The table considers the “No-Isomorphic” scenarios (Section 5.3.1),
where feature vectors are unique. We see that XGBoost generates the best resulting
irrespective of the feature types used when combining features together for classification,
yielding up to 0.9819 F1 and 0.0095 FPR. In particular, when individual features are
considered, our TSG performs very well with a 0.93 F1 score. The best performance of
0.9819 F1 score is achieved when a combination of all di↵erent features and late fusion
is used (with basic feature’s weight as 0.344, TSG feature’s as 0.116, LM feature’s
weight as 0.105, and CG feature’s weight as 0.435 in classification).
We also compare the same classifiers with di↵erent feature combinations to predict
whether a malicious object belongs to either the banking trojan class (i.e., ABT)
or is in the “other-malware” type category. The resulting F1 scores and FPRs are
shown in Table 5.3. Again, we see that DBank with XGBoost classifier generates the
best results with an F1 of 0.9507 and an FPR of 0.0553 when considering the feature
combination using late fusion (with basic feature’s weight as 0.345, TSG feature’s as
0.338, LM feature’s weight as 0.076, and CG feature’s weight as 0.241 in classification),
whereas our TSG features1 perform lower (0.8484 F1 score). Despite this slightly
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lower performance of TSG in this setting, we later show that TSG features have
some interesting defensive properties that make it harder for the attacker to guess the
defender’s predictions (see Section 5.1.3).
Moreover, we observe that ABT vs. other-malware performance is slightly lower
than what we saw when distinguishing ABTs from goodware, and reflects the fact
that ABTs have more in common with other malware than they have with goodware.
This is not surprising. We know that some ABTs also have a spyware component. For
instance, the well-known Asacub ABT also acts as a form of spyware.1 .
5.1.2. Key Features in Android Banking Trojan’s Detection
Key Features Distinguishing ABTs from Goodware. We also investigated
the key features that distinguish ABTs from goodware in the “No-Isomorphic” case.
Figure 5.2 shows 10 of the top 25 features that distinguish ABTs from goodware. Each
histogram corresponds to a specific feature (e.g., number of calls to the android.view
package); the X-axis reports the feature values, whereas the Y -axis reports the percentage of ABT (resp. goodware) that have a certain feature value. For example, Figure 5.2
shows that having the RECEIVE SMS, READ PHONE STATE and SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW
permission are some of the most important features distinguishing ABTs from goodware because ABTs are far more likely to have this permission than goodware. Likewise,
Android apps that do not invoke any methods in the API package android.widget
and/or android.view are far more likely to be ABTs than goodware.
Key Features Distinguishing ABTs from Other-malware. We also investigate the key features that distinguish ABTs from other malware in the “No-Isomorphic”
case. Figure 5.3 shows 10 of the 25 top features that distinguish ABTs from other
malware. We see from Figure 5.3 that the READ SMS, GET TASKS and CALL PHONE
permissions are very e↵ective in distinguishing ABTs from other malware, since ABTs
1

A Kaspersky report from April 2018 [83] states that: “We encountered the TrojanBanker.AndroidOS.Asacub family for the first time in 2015, when the first versions of the malware
were detected, analyzed, and found to be more adept at spying than stealing funds.”
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Figure 5.2: ABT vs Goodware: Histograms of distinguishing features values.

Figure 5.3: ABT vs Other-malware: Histograms of distinguishing features values.

are far more likely to have these permissions than other-malware. These permissions
are likely used by ABTs to prevent and stop any call and alert SMS from a bank
notifying unusual account activity. On the other hand, the other most important
features have distributions that make using them individually for predicting whether
an APK is an ABT or another malware type much more challenging. This again
is not surprising as functionalities and behaviors of ABTs are harder to distinguish
from other malware than from goodware. We emphasize that it is the combination of
these features that enables us to make good predictions, and that these features by
themselves do not do that.
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5.1.3. Robustness Analysis
In this section, we study the robustness of our novel TSG features against an adversary
who uses machine learning using publicly available training data. Because resources
such as VirusTotal are available to many people (including malicious attackers), and
because large criminal networks have no trouble in gaining access to existing malware,
they have access to huge numbers of Android samples. Suppose S is the set of all apps
available to the defender which he got through some public services (e.g., VirusTotal).
In particular, S ◆ {B [ G}, where B is the set of ABTs and G is the set of goodware
used by the defender for training.
We study two questions in this section:
(a) Suppose the attacker trains on a set that intersects part of B [ G. How well
would he infer the predictions of the defender model to craft an attack, depending
on the size of this intersection? How di↵erent would the attacker feature space
be?
(b) How much of S do we need to use in a training set B [ G in order to ensure that
we achieve and maintain high detection accuracy while deceiving an adversary
who is potentially using other subsets of S?
The next two subsections determine the answers to these two questions.
Robustness based on Intersection of Defender and Adversary Training
Data. We study the first question by varying the size of the intersection

2

{10%, 20%, . . . , 90%} of the training set used by the attacker with the training set
B [ G used by the defender. We call

the overlap ratio, which represents the

percentage of data shared by both the attacker and the defender used to train their
models. We define the adversary’s error rate as the percentage of attacker predictions
disagreeing with the defender model (e.g., the defender predicts a sample as ABT
whereas the adversary predicts it as goodware).
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We randomly select 50 subsets of samples for the adversary with similar distributions as B [ G, and measure the ratio of the adversary’s error rate, normalized
by dividing it by the error rate of the baseline (consisting of static features from the
APK’s Manifest and the Dynamic features) as the overlap ratio is varied (X-axis).
The result is shown in Figure 5.4: both when predicting ABTs vs. goodware, as well
as predicting ABTs vs. other malware. In both cases, we see that even if the adversary
knows 80% of the set B [ G used by us, it is still the case that the error rate generated
using DBank is over 3 times the error of the baseline when distinguishing ABTs from
goodware, and over 1.6 times the error rate of the baseline when distinguishing ABTs
from other malware.
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Figure 5.4: Adversary Error Rate vs. Overlap Ratio divided by baseline: Manifest + Dynamic.
Higher values imply better robustness.

We now also evaluate how close the feature space of the attacker is to the feature
space of the defender, by varying

as before. But this time we study the distances

between the feature vectors of defender’s samples using B, G and using the samples
used by the adversary. We tested our algorithm against many distance functions
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including Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance, Kolomogorov-Smirnov distance,
Chebyshev distance, and Cosine distance. We report results with Euclidean distance
and K-S distance in the main body of the paper, while charts for the other distance
metrics are reported in Appendix D (Online Supplementary Material).
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the distances between the feature vectors generated
using B, G as compared to the training samples used by the adversary decreases as we
vary

. We see that the TSG features generate the biggest distances, substantially

more than traditional features. In all cases, we note that as

increases, the distance

between the feature vectors generated using B, G as compared to the training samples
used by the adversary decreases. This is not surprising as an increase in
the adversary more accurately guessed what we used to train on.
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Figure 5.5: Euclidean distance among attacker’s and defender’s feature sets centroids. High values
imply higher robustness.

63

Detection and Analysis of Android Malware Families

Figure 5.6: Kolomogorov-Smirnov distance among attacker’s and defender’s feature sets centroids.
High values imply higher robustness.

Accuracy-Robustness Trade-o↵ of DBank’s TSG vs traditional features.
In this section, we answer the second question posed at the beginning of this section.
Specifically, we would like to understand whether the defender can use a subset of his
training samples and change it over time to mislead the attacker. The first concern
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when considering a smaller training sample is that predictive accuracy will drop. In
this section, we evaluate how AUC and robustness vary when the defender uses smaller
percentages ⇢ of the training data. Each experiment also varies the overlap ratio

, as

before. The result is shown in Figure 5.7: both when predicting ABTs vs. goodware.
The x-axis varies the percentage of defender’s training data ⇢, while the y-axis reports
values normalized by the value obtained with traditional features. By varying the
size of the intersection overlap ratio

2 {10%, 20%, . . . , 90%} with B [ G, also vary

the actually used size of the total training sets with ⇢ 2 {10%, 20%, . . . , 90%}. Again,
we randomly select 50 sets of samples for the adversary with similar distributions as
B [ G, and measure the ratio of the prediction’s error rate, normalized by dividing it
by the error rate of the baseline (consisting of API package call features, static features
from the APK’s Manifest and the Dynamic features) as the overlap ratio (di↵erent
non-red + lines) and the training set ratio is varied (X-axis), and the predicted AUC
results by only TSG features (red + lines).
Values higher than 1 in the y-axis of Figure 5.7 imply that TSG-based features are
better than traditional features (e.g., Manifest, Dynamic) in terms of adversary error
rate. We see that the error rate generated using TSG features is always greater than
the error of the baseline when distinguishing ABTs from goodware, while our TSG
features yield high predictive accuracy AUCs. We also report AUC and show that it
remains high in the di↵erent scenarios even when 20% or 30% of the training set is
used. This allows the defender to use a moving defense surface [76, 84] by changing
the specific training set over time while maintaining good predictive accuracy (AUC)
performance.
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Figure 5.7: AUC performance and adversary error rate of DBank’s TSG vs. traditional features
using di↵erent proportions ⇢ of the training set.
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Robustness against Fake Calls. Another attack that can be launched against
DBank is that of “fake calls”. For instance, we see from the previous discussion that
a low frequency of calls to some particular Android API packages may help DBank
identify a binary as an ABT. An attacker can try to evade this by making more calls
to that API to avoid suspicion. A fake call to an API package adds edges to the
Triadic Suspicion Graph. Suppose we define the “fake call percentage” or FCP to be
the ratio of the number of fake calls in a TSG to the total number of edges in the
TSG (both real and fake). Figure 5.8 shows that DBank is robust to an attack that
tries to increase the FCP with the Random Forest classifier used in DBank showing
AUCs close to 1.

Figure 5.8: Impact of Fake Call Attack on DBank’s Performance

Section 5.2

A Data-Driven Characterization of Modern
Android Spyware
Dataset. We download 5000 spyware, 5000 goodware and 5000 other malware samples
from VirusTotal [85], a service that scans suspicious files and URLs submitted by
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users to be tested against multiple commercial AV systems. All samples in our dataset
were first submitted to VirusTotal between July 1 2016 and July 1 2017. This choice is
also motivated by [86] which empirically determines that VirusTotal’s AV detections
become stable one year after initial submission.
We use Symantec threat descriptions [87] to identify spyware families. In particular,
we consider an Android malware family to be a spyware family if Symantec indicates
that the malware family steals information such as location, browsing history, credentials, contacts, or photos. In total, we obtain 54 spyware family names.

2

It is worth

noting that some spyware families may also have some overlapping behaviors typical
of other malware categories (e.g., sending premium SMSs, banking trojans). We use
the VirusTotal Intelligence API to download Android APKs belonging to our list of
spyware families that were detected as malicious by at least 10 antivirus engines [86].
We also use the VirusTotal Intelligence API to collect malware samples that are
not spyware; we refer to this category as other-malware.3 Finally, we collect goodware
by querying the VirusTotal Intelligence API for samples first found in the wild between
July 2016 and July 2017 which were not labeled as malware by any of the 63 VirusTotal
antivirus engines (i.e., detection rate was 0%).
5.2.1. Supervised Learning Algorithms and Ensemble Late Fusion (ELF)
Traditional Classifiers. We consider six widely used traditional classifiers [88]:
Random Forest (RF), Decision Tree (DT), Supper Vector Machine (SVM), K-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN), Naı̈ve Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR). Traditional classification algorithms take as their input a set of (feature vector, class) pairs. For
2

We also tried to download the following families in [87] form VirusTotal [85], but no samples were
present (for the period July 2016 - July 2017): Spywaller, Sockrat, Bossefiv, Alienspy, Accstealer,
Gomal, Fitikser, Ballonpop, Repane, Dupvert, Sberick, Simhosy, ZertSecurity, Teelog, Yatoot.
3
In the query submitted to VirusTotal, we look for Android APKs that have been detected as
malicious by at least 10 antivirus engines, and that do not belong to our list of spyware families and
do not contain “spyware” keywords. As in related work [36], we also decide to exclude adware from
this other-malware category because they usually represent applications that annoy users with an
excessive number of ads, as opposed to compromise user devices.
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instance, for each Android app, we extract a feature as described in Section 3, and
the class is either 1 (“spyware”) or 0 (“goodware” or “other-malware”, depending on
the experiment we are considering). Traditional classification algorithms try to find
di↵erent equational forms that separate one class from the others. For instance, linear
Support Vector Machines (SVM) try to draw a hyperplane that splits the feature
vector space into two classes. SVM may use di↵erent equational forms: linear SVM
uses a straight hyperplane, while kernel SVMs use diverse shapes. Other traditional
classifiers (e.g. Decision Tree) use a set of generalized (to higher dimensions) rectangles
to state that if a feature vector is within one of these generalized rectangles then
it is most likely spyware; and in the other class (either goodware or other malware,
depending on the problem we study) when it is not in any such rectangle. Hence,
di↵erent classifiers try to split the space into a “spyware” part and a second part
(either goodware or other-malware). As the assumptions made by some classifiers
may be inconsistent with the actual data: some traditional classifiers may perform
well, while others may perform poorly. One of the major goals of machine learning
is to identify the right classifier for any given data set. We, therefore, use multiple
traditional classifiers to see which one is best at distinguishing spyware vs. goodware,
and spyware vs. other malware types.
Deep Learning Classifiers. We additionally consider four representative deep
learning classifiers which have achieved outstanding results in many ML tasks: MultiLayer Perceptrons (MLP), Bernoulli Restricted Boltzmann Machines (BRBM), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and the Wide & Deep [89] DL architecture recently
proposed by Google. We do not consider sequence-based classifiers as the dynamic
analysis logs are a collection of events without timestamps, and because our goal is to
consider static and dynamic features together (see Section 3). We performed extensive
hyper-parameter tuning to achieve the best results with deep learning methods (despite
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Classifiers
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Figure 5.9: Scheme of the ELF architecture.

the fact that they are less accurate than shallow learning methods, probably due to
the limited data available).
Ensemble Late Fusion ( ELF). Our ELF architecture shown in Figure 5.9 combines
the results of traditional and deep classifiers into a unified prediction. The first part
of ELF follows a traditional cycle and is shown in the top part of Figure 5.9. From
a set of Android APKs, we extract a set of static and dynamic features and then
perform a supervised classification step using a set of classifiers. Instead of using
the binary prediction generated, ELF, uses the probability returned by each classifier
that a particular Android app belongs to the class 1 (spyware) vs. the class 0 (either
goodware or other malware). ELF then computes a weighted sum of these probabilities
by assigning a weight to each classifier such that the weights add up to one. In order
to assign these weights, ELF performs a grid search to identify near-optimal weights
without looking at the test set.
To describe ELF more formally, let us consider a binary classification task where an
object xj can have a predicted label ŷj = 0 (goodware or other malware), and ŷj = 1
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(spyware). Each classifier outputs a probability of belonging to class 1, pj 2 [0.0, 1.0],
where for a given object xj , if pj > 0.5 then the predicted label ŷj = 1, else ŷj = 0.
Since we are considering several supervised classifiers, the i-th classifier outputs a
certain probability pij that an object xj belongs to class 1. The ensemble algorithm
computes a Late Fusion Score (LFS) as the weighted sum of the probabilities of all
the classifiers:
LF Sj =

X

wi pij

(5.1)

i2classifiers

where wi is the weight (relevance) of the i-th classifier in the decision, and

P

i

wi = 1.

Then, if LF Sj > 0.5 an object xj is assigned label ŷj = 1, otherwise ŷj = 0.

Training ELF weights. We now describe how we identify the best weights for ELF
to use. We first split the dataset into two parts: ELF training set and ELF testing set.
The identification of the weights relies exclusively on the training set, on which we
perform 10-fold cross-validation with all possible weights combinations of the di↵erent
classifiers; the performance on the validation is determined according to the weighted
score described previously in Equation 5.1. The optimal ELF weights correspond to
the ones that obtain the highest performance on the validation set, for all the 10-folds.
Note that the testing set is never involved in the weight-training process. This weight
training procedure is repeated in a 10-fold CV fashion for di↵erent train/test splits.
The final ELF results that we report are the 10-fold average performance obtained by
using the best weights found with this procedure.
5.2.2. Evaluation
We evaluate the accuracy of the di↵erent classifiers described earlier using 10-fold
cross-validation. Identifying the best performing classifier is a necessary step to
determine the features that best distinguish spyware from goodware and from other
malware.
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Table 5.4: Performance of classifiers in spyware vs goodware (average with 10-fold
cross-validation). The best traditional classifier is RF. The best overall classifier is ELF
with weights wRF = 0.711, wW ide&Deep = 0.222, wBRBM = 0.045 , and wSV M = 0.022.
The p-values are computed via a t-test comparing F1 -Scores. We also use standard
statistical notation ***, **, * (***<0.01; **<0.05; *<0.1).
R AUC

FPR

p-val vs. ELF

Algorithm

F1

P

FNR p-val vs. RF

RF
DT
KNN
NB
LR
SVM

0.976
0.971
0.869
0.782
0.704
0.423

0.990
0.970
0.868
0.663
0.774
1.000

0.963
0.973
0.870
0.954
0.645
0.269

0.977
0.971
0.868
0.732
0.727
0.635

0.98%
3.08%
13.36%
48.95%
19.08%
0.00%

3.70%
2.70%
13.01%
4.80%
35.45%
73.09%

N/A
*** (1.302 ·10
*** (8.897 ·10
*** (0)
*** (0)
*** (0)

***
39 ) ***
282 ) ***
***
***
***

(4.309 ·10
(1.028 ·10
(1.158 ·10
(0)
(0)
(0)

MLP
BRBM
CNN
W&D [89]

0.674
0.701
0.623
0.671

0.907
0.918
0.590
0.883

0.537
0.568
0.783
0.548

0.741
0.758
0.587
0.742

5.59%
5.15%
62.90%
8.21%

46.30%
43.18%
21.73%
45.19%

***
***
***
***

***
***
169 ) ***
319 ) ***

(0)
(0)
(1.568 ·10
(3.859 ·10

(0)
(0)
(3.157 ·10
(6.993 ·10

ELF 0.982 0.988 0.977 0.982 1.23% 2.34% *** (4.309 ·10

53 )

53 )
122 )
287 )

165 )
318 )

N/A

Metrics. We use the following traditional ML performance metrics: F1 -Score,
Precision, Recall, AUC (AUROC), FPR (False Positive Rate), and FNR (False
Negative Rate) for a complete view of the performance of every approach. We also
report p-values obtained via a Student’s t-test in order to show statistical significance.
Readers will recall that a result is statistically significant when the p-value is less than
0.05 [88]. Moreover, we recall that: the lower the p-value, the higher the statistical
significance.
Spyware vs. Goodware. Table 5.4 shows the performance of di↵erent traditional
classifiers in separating spyware from goodware.
Traditional and Deep Classifiers Performance. Of the individual algorithms.
Random Forest and Decision Trees achieve the best accuracy: both achieve an F-Score
and AUC of 0.97, with RF performing slightly better. Linear SVM is the worst,
possibly because the feature space is not linearly separable—in contrast, KNN, DT
and RF can draw non-linear decision boundaries. Despite extensive hyper-parameter
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tuning, the deep learning algorithms do not achieve good performance, probably to the
limited amount of training data. Decision Trees achieve the lowest false negative rate
(2.70%), which suggests that it largely avoids mislabeling spyware as goodware, and
a relatively low false positive rate (3.08%). Random Forest achieves the lowest false
positive rate (0.98%) while keeping the false negative rate also relatively low (3.70%).
Keeping false positives low is important in order to prevent warnings from getting
ignored. In summary, Decision Tree is the preferred classifier if low false negatives
are the priority and Random Forest is the best classifier if low false positives are the
priority.
ELF Performance. We trained ELF on the training data by trying all possible
P
weights wi in steps of 0.05, so that the following constraint is preserved: i wi = 1.
Because we have six shallow traditional classifiers and four deep learning classifiers in
the ensemble, we want to find a vector of weights (w1 , . . . , w10 ) such that assigning
these weights to each classifier’s predictions maximizes F1 -Score and AU C. After
performing tuning of ELF weights with the process described in Section ??, we
identify the following optimal positive weights: wRF = 0.711, wW ide&Deep = 0.222,
wBRBM = 0.045 , and wSV M = 0.022 (all other weights are 0). These weights represent
the relative importance of each decision algorithm in the classification, suggesting
that ELF identifies Random Forest as the most important base predictor, Wide &
Deep [89] as the second, followed by BRBM and SVM. The last row of Table 5.4 shows
the performance of ELF. We observe that ELF improves all performance metrics, and
minimizes the trade-o↵ between FPR and FNR. It is also relevant to observe that
while the improvement may seem minor (e.g., F1 -Score of 0.982 for ELF vs. 0.976 for
RF), it is actually pretty large as the maximal performance can only go up to 1.
We also used the t-test to compute the p-values in Table 5.4 comparing the F1
score of ELF against DT and RF and ELF using 10-fold CV repeated 30 times. As all
the p-values are far below 0.01, the finding that ELF is superior to both RF and DT
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is statistically significant.
Table 5.5: Performance of classifiers in spyware vs other-malware (average with
10-fold cross-validation). The best traditional classifier is RF, which is outperformed
by ELF with positive weights wRF = 0.967 and wBRBM = 0.033. The p-values are
computed through the t-test performed against the F1 -Score results and, in addition to
the raw p-values, we also use the statistical confidence notation ***, **, * (***<0.01;
**<0.05; *<0.1).
Algorithm

F1

P

R AUC

FPR

RF
DT
KNN
LR
NB
SVM

0.955
0.949
0.784
0.707
0.416
0.445

0.963
0.945
0.778
0.771
0.745
0.996

0.945
0.953
0.790
0.655
0.290
0.287

0.959
0.954
0.802
0.747
0.604
0.643

2.97%
4.60%
18.61%
16.07%
8.23%
0.09%

5.35%
4.65%
21.04%
34.48%
71.04%
71.28%

N/A
(2.798 ·10
*** (0)
*** (0)
*** (0)
*** (0)

MLP
BRBM
CNN
W&D [89]

0.120
0.717
0.028
0.074

0.645
0.662
0.138
0.653

0.067
0.783
0.015
0.040

0.518
0.726
0.501
0.418

3.14%
33.15%
0.79%
1.92%

93.35%
21.68%
98.45%
95.99%

***
***
***
***

p-val vs. ELF

FNR p-val vs. RF
47 )

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

ELF 0.960 0.966 0.954 0.963 2.74% 4.59% *** (4.534 ·10

83 )

***
***
***
***
***
***

(4.534 ·10
(1.041 ·10
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

***
***
***
***

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

83 )
122 )

N/A

Spyware vs. Other Malware. Performance of Traditional and Deep Classifiers.
Table 5.5 reports the performance of di↵erent traditional classifiers in separating
spyware from other malware using 10-fold cross-validation. RF achieves the best
performance: 0.955 F-Score and 0.959 AUC, with 2.97% false positive rate (FPR) and
5.35% false negative rate (FNR). Here false negatives mean that spyware is mislabeled
as other malware which could potentially delay analysts seeking to develop signatures
and patches.
Though our ability to separate spyware from other forms of malware is quite high,
the results in distinguishing spyware from other malware (shown in Table 5.5) are
slightly lower than those for distinguishing spyware vs goodware (Table 5.4). This
is because spyware is more similar to other malware than to goodware, and hence
the classifier finds this task more challenging. For instance, some banking trojans
(e.g., Acecard) may behave like spyware in order to more e↵ectively carry out banking
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fraud.
Performance of ELF. We now consider the performance of ELF. As in the previous
subsection, we use 10-fold cross-validation on the training data to find the weights wi
P
of the ensemble while requiring that i wi = 1. The weights that maximize F1 -Score
and AU C are: wRF = 0.967 and wBRBM = 0.033 (all other classifiers weights are

0). Note that these weights are di↵erent from the case in which we tried to separate
spyware from goodware. We report the performance of ELF in the last row of Table 5.5.
We observe that by combining the algorithms, ELF improves all performance metrics,
and minimizes the trade-o↵ between FPR and FNR. Again, while the improvement
may seem minor, performance is already very high. As before, Table 5.4 shows the
result of performing a t-test comparing ELF’s F1-score and AUC to those of the best
performing individual classifiers. As all the p-values are substantially below 0.01,
ELF’s superior performance is not due to chance and has statistical significance.
5.2.3. Distinguishing Characteristics of Spyware
The principal goal of this paper is to identify features that best separate spyware
from goodware and from other malware. We do this via the Mean Decreased Impurity
(MDI) metric. MDI is a traditional feature selection method used by Decision Trees
in the Random Forest algorithm [88] which progressively splits individual features in
order to separate the data more e↵ectively. Minimal impurity is achieved when all
the objects belong to a single label. For example, the presence or absence of certain
permission (e.g., READ PHONE STATE) may be used by DTs to split feature vectors into
two separate groups to decrease impurity. We consider the traditional version with the
Gini definition of impurity [88]. We use MDI scores to build feature-value histograms
that show the distributions of feature values for the two classes (e.g. spyware vs.
goodware or spyware vs. other malware).
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Table 5.6: Features distinguishing spyware from goodware and from other malware

Spyware vs. Goodware and Other Malware. Table 5.6 shows a summary of
the features which best separate spyware from goodware and from other malware
(the Appendix reports the full feature histograms). Each group-row in Table 5.6
corresponds to a di↵erent category (i.e., spyware, goodware, other malware), and
the presence of a static (resp. dynamic) features implies a prevalence of that feature
in that category and its absence (or lower prevalence) from the other ones. We can
observe that:
• The feature SEND SMS is primarily prevalent in spyware and less present in
goodware and other malware.
• Spyware apps tend to have a smaller filesize and fewer Android components
than goodware. This may indicate that most spyware is not repackaged versions
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of goodware apps. They could be developed as ad-hoc malware to steal user
information or might be repackaged versions of small apps.
• Static features (specifical requests for Android permissions) play an important
role in separating spyware from other categories. The relevance of “permission”
features is related to the fact that Android applications need to ask for permission
in advance in order to access certain resources (e.g. software or hardware). Some
of the most relevant permissions are related to: accessing sensitive information
(e.g., READ PHONE STATE, GET TASKS) and sending information to attackers (e.g.,
SEND SMS, CHANGE NETWORK STATE).
• One of the main permissions that other types of malware request is the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW
permission, which allows displaying windows on top of the screen. For example,
this permission can be used by mobile ransomware in order to block access to
devices or to use hidden overlays for privilege escalation [90]. This permission
also has legitimate uses such as showing Facebook chat notifications. Spyware
requires this permission much less frequently, but other malware often uses this
permission to keep windows hidden from the user.
• Finally, it is interesting to observe that none of the Android spyware samples
starts an Android Service named AdminService, whereas other types of malware do—likely to start stealthy background processes with a name that looks
legitimate to users.
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Section 5.3

Android Malware Detection via (Somewhat)
Robust Irreversible Feature Transformations
5.3.1. The FARM Dataset
In this section, we briefly introduce the FARM dataset which consists of a mix of
Android goodware, rooting malware, spyware, banking trojans, and other malware.
For a sample to be tagged in one of these malware categories, we required that there
be at least 2 reports on Koodous4 confirming this status. Table 5.7 summarizes the
statistics of the FARM dataset.
Table 5.7: Dataset description
Number of APKs
Isomorphic No-Isomorphic
Goodware
3535
2999
Rooting Malware
1829
444
Banking Trojans
7107
1061
Spyware
3247
841
Other-Malware (Not Rooting)
4596
2081
Other-Malware (Not Banking Trojans)
3973
1806
Other-Malware (Not Spyware)
4382
1922

5.3.2. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we describe the results of the experiments that we have designed
to evaluate the performance of FARM with di↵erent feature combinations. Our
experimental evaluation includes four parts: (1) Distinguishing each of the 3 types
Android malware (banking trojans, rooting malware, spyware) from goodware on
both the Isomorphic and No-Isomorphic datasets; (2) Distinguishing each of the
3 types Android malware (banking trojans, rooting malware, spyware) from other
types of malware on both the Isomorphic and No-Isomorphic datasets; (3) Evaluating
4

https://koodous.com/
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Table 5.8: Multiple metrics (AUC and F1 etc.) on Android Malware detection vs.
Goodware / Other-malware No-Isomorphic dataset.

robustness of FARM against 3 attacks. In addition, FARM discovered two new rooting
malware samples - a fact that was not previously known to any of the 61 anti-virus
engines on VirusTotal. As (1) and (2) involve 12 experiments in all, we present a
sample in the main body of the paper. Readers may find more details at

5

part of the

paper. We used 10 fold cross-validation and 8 classifiers.6
Late Fusion. The predicted probabilities pi of the M = 8 classifiers Ci , i = 1, . . . , 8
P
P
are linearly combined by FARM as p = M
i = 1. We find the best
i=1 i pi , where

value of the

is

by doing a grid search and optimizing performance on the training set.

5.3.3. No Adversarial Attack Case
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 summarize the results of experiments on 5 settings (described
5

https://drive.google.com/open?id=14ZQyFtsu6exZhoav4z-1aDZXPWrnMNjv
Classifiers used: (1) Bernoulli Naive Bayes, (2) Random Forest, (3) Nearest Neighbors, (4)
Logistic Regression, (5) Gaussian Naive Bayes, (6) AdaBoost Classifier, (7) Gradient Boosting
Decision Tree, (8) XGB Classifier and (9) SVM.
6
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Table 5.9: Multiple metrics (AUC and F1 etc.) on Android Malware detection vs.
Goodware / Other-malware Isomorphic dataset.

below) in the no attack case. Each of the 5 settings is defined below.

7

LM for LM,

F C, CG for FC and CG. When more than one of LM, FC, and CG are used at the
same time, their N s are set to the same value. “Distance” column is used to state the
best distance measure for classifiers with LM features, and “Classifier” stands for the
classifier selected with the best performance.
SET 1 Baseline: Basic Features Only. Due to a large number of SD features,
we first compared the performance of classifiers with all or part of SD features using
feature selection methods. We found that a certain number of selected features yielded
the best F1 score. This is done via a standard ablation test. In ablation testing, we
7

We use “SD” to refer to static and dynamic features, “API” to refer to API package call features,
“LM” to refer to the landmark-based features (furthermore, we use “-Rand”, “-Cluster” and “-Max-dis”
to represent the three types of landmark selection methods), “FC” corresponds to feature value
clustering-based features, and “CG” is for correlation graph-based features. We use “LF(·, ..., ·)”
denotes the late fusion classifier with appropriate feature inputs. Of the various metrics reported, the
most important one is the “F1-score”, which reflects a balance of precision and recall. The column
N stands for the number of landmarks or clusters used by LM, FC, and CG.
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first compute the performance (F1-score) with all features; we then drop 1 feature and
see which feature leads to the biggest drop in performance — this feature, f1 is the
most important. We then repeat this process to find the second most important feature
f2 (which is the feature that leads to the biggest drop in performance, assuming f1 is
already dropped), the third most important feature f3 , and so forth. For each fj , we
compute the performance of the classifiers using the features in Fj = F

{f1 , . . . , fj }.

For each Fj , we compute the performance of our classifiers using just the features in
F

Fj , and choose the j that leads to the highest performance. When distinguishing

between rooting malware and goodware, we found that j = 50 selected features lead to
the best F1 score 0.9195. We then trained classifiers with API features only, as well as
the combination of SD and API features (row “SD + API”) respectively. The results
of combining SD and API features (better than using SD or API features alone) in
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 (SET1) show that the baselines achieve F1-scores of 88.87-96.97%
and 91.96-98.26% on the No-Isomorphic and Isomorphic datasets respectively. These
are the numbers that FARM has to beat.
SET 2 FARM w/ LM: FARM with Landmark based Features. Our SET 2
experiments first compared FARM with LM-features alone while changing the landmark
selection method and varying the number of landmarks LM . Of the three landmark
selection methods, we found that the max-distance heuristic selection (LM-Max dis)
is both not competitive and far more time-consuming. We, therefore, abandoned
this method in the following experiments. Next, we compared the remaining two
landmark selection methods by combining them with SD, API, and SD + API features
respectively. The results show that FARM with landmark features alone beats the
baseline in all 12 cases with F1-Scores of 93.78-98.26% and 94.06-99.08% for the
No-Isomorphic and Isomorphic datasets respectively.
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SET 3 FARM w/ FC: FARM with Feature Value Clustering based Features.
The SET 3 experiments used FARM with classifiers trained on data generated using
the feature clustering-based features (w.r.t. di↵erent number of clusters G and the
one with the best performance is presented in N column) and combine them with SD,
API, and SD + API features respectively. Our SET 3 results show that FARM obtains
F1-scores of 92.08-98.6% and 94.22-99.06% respectively. Here again, FARM beats the
baseline in all 12 experiments and returns results comparable to those generated by
LM-features.
SET 4 FARM w/ CG: FARM with Correlation Graph based Features. In
SET 4 experiments, we trained our classifiers with the correlation graph-based features
(w.r.t. di↵erent number of clusters G) and combined them with SD, API, and SD +
API features respectively. Our results show that FARM with CG features beats the
baselines on all 12 cases and achieves F1-scores of 94.03-98.56% and 92.96-99.55% on
the No-Isomorphic and Isomorphic datasets respectively.
SET 5 FARM w/ all: FARM Approach with All Transformed Features.
In SET 5 experiments, we used features from all the proposed feature transformation
methods and combined them with SD, API, and SD + API features respectively.
The experimental results show that FARM achieves F1-scores of 94.38-99.53% and
95.61-99.69%, again beating out the baselines on all 12 problems. Moreover, the
combination of all three feature transformations generated the best results in all.
Statistical Significance. We tested the null hypothesis that the best baseline for
each of the 12 problems considered was generated by the same underlying process as
the best setting of FARM (i.e. with LF (LM, F C, CG, SD, AP I).) The null hypothesis
was rejected in all 12 cases with p 3.5337e-3 in all cases, i.e. the probability that the
same underlying process generated both the best baseline results and the best FARM
results is so low that it is almost zero. Thus, the claim that FARM is better than the
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best baseline in distinguishing across the 12 problems considered is statistically valid.
Table 5.10: Statistical Results p-value of best settings of FARM over the best baseline
Classification Problem
p value
Goodware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
1.0959e 10
Goodware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
1.0539e 6
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic)
2.5891e 7
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
1.6523e 4
Goodware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
8.1829e 6
Goodware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
4.4940e 4
Other-malware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
3.5337e 3
Other-malware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
3.3029e 7
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic) 7.6698e 5
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
1.4564e 6
Other-malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
2.7297e 4
Other-malware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
3.6931e 4

5.3.4. Robustness Evaluation
The goal of the three feature transformations introduced in this paper is to make FARM
more robust in the presence of adversarial attacks. We can be sure that malicious
hackers will adapt their malware once they realize that it has been detected and
that anti-virus engines have developed signatures to protect Android devices from
the threat. Though it is impossible to imagine all the types of evasion methods that
malicious hackers might come up with, we tested the robustness of FARM against
three kinds of attacks.
Threat Model. We assume that the adversary: (i) knows all the 1058 basic features
used by FARM, and (ii) that the adversary is also familiar with the suite of 8 classifiers
used in the paper (Bernoulli and Gaussian Naive Bayes, Random Forest, k-Nearest
Neighbor, Logistic Regression, Adaboost, Gradient Boosted Decision Tree, XGB, and
SVM). We further assume that the attacker has read this paper and hence knows about
the three types of feature transformation used. But we do not assume the attacker
knows any of the following: (i) the specific landmarks used, the landmark selection
strategy used and/or distance function used by the defender in the Landmark-based
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Feature transformation, (ii) the number of clusters and the

feature combination

algorithm used in the Feature-Value-based Clustering Transformation, and (iii) the
number of groups and the specific

operator used by the defender in the Correlation-

Graph based feature transformation. We further assume that the attacker carries out
the three kinds of attacks described below.

8

We assume the attacker tries three kinds

of attacks:
(a) Fake API Package calls in which the adversary injects irrelevant API package
calls into his malware.
(b) Fake permission requests in which the adversary requests permissions that are
irrelevant for his malware.
(c) Reduced API Package calls in which the adversary tries to artificially reduce
the number of calls made to API packages.
Note that it is more or less impossible to imagine all the types of attacks that a savvy
attacker may come up with - hence, in this paper, we limit our claims of robustness to
these types of attacks.
Fake API package call feature attack. Here, attackers try to evade FARM by
increasing the percentage of fake API package calls made, i.e. by adding more and
more fake API package calls into the code. Table 5.11 shows that the impact of
this attack on FARM is just 10.47-72.12% than the impact on the baselines — on
average, across the 12 classification problems, the impact on FARM is 36%, i.e. FARM
is about 3 times as robust as the baselines across the 12 problems studied in this
paper. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the impact of this attack on the best version of
FARM (blue line with square markers) compared to the best baseline (yellow line with
8
We do not claim that FARM is robust against all kinds of adversarial attacks (e.g. obfuscated
gradient attacks [91]). Indeed, such a claim would be very hard to justify for almost any paper
without making some unrealistic assumptions.
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Table 5.11: Average impact score a of FARM over the best baseline on increased fake
API package call attack
Classification Problem
a
Goodware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
0.1846
Goodware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
0.6824
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic)
0.1047
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
0.7212
Goodware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
0.1138
Goodware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
0.4505
Other-malware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
0.2310
Other-malware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
0.2989
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic) 0.1728
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
0.5348
Other-malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
0.1047
Other-malware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
0.7212

dot markers) as the percentage of fake calls increases in the rooting app vs. goodware
and rooting app vs. other malware classification problems respectively.
Surprisingly, as more fake API package calls are made, it becomes easier for
classifiers to identify rooting malware. This suggests that the malicious behavior of
malware is related to the API package calls that they make. For example, Android
Banking Trojans call API android.app.admin to hijack a smartphone’s administrative
features at the system level, while it is not commonly called in Android Goodware.
Thus, when we simulate the attacker’s behavior and increasing the Fake Call Percentage
in malware, the performance of the classifier using both our best setting and baseline
improves because the fake calls may involve the malware calls many more API calls
than a piece of goodware would ordinarily make. FARM always achieves better F1
performance, especially when the attacker injects only a small percentage of fake API
package calls (which is the best strategy for him as this is when both FARM and the
baselines’ predictive accuracy is lowest in this situation).
Fake permission attack. Second, we assume that attackers try to evade malware
detection by increasing the number of permissions they seek. Table 5.12 shows that
on average, the impact of this attack on FARMis 10.25-74.42% of the impact on the
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Table 5.12: Average impact score a of FARM over the best baseline on increased
percentage of permissions attack
Classification Problem
a
Goodware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
0.1952
Goodware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
0.6063
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic)
0.1025
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
0.7442
Goodware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
0.1376
Goodware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
0.4623
Other-malware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
0.2286
Other-malware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
0.2617
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic) 0.1791
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
0.5250
Other-malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
0.1025
Other-malware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
0.7442

best baseline, with the average impact on FARM being 35.74%. Thus, as in the case of
the first attack, FARM is about 3 times as robust to this attack than the best baseline.
The “fake permission” percentage in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 refer to the percentage
of requested permissions that are fake. The figures respectively show the results of
distinguishing between rooting malware and goodware on the one hand, and other
malware on the other hand. We see that as more permissions are required, both
FARM and the baselines do a better job in detecting rooting malware. But again, the
best-case scenario for the attacker is when the percentage of fake (unused) permissions
is below about 8%, and in this case, FARM beats the baselines. FARM performs
better than the best baseline because malware also achieves its malicious function
by calling system permissions in the manifest file. For example, Android Spyware
uses system permissions permission:RECEIVE SMS and permission:READ SMS to
steal messages from the smartphone while common Android Goodware does not. Also,
both common Android Goodware and Android Spyware do not call the permission
android.permission.SET TIME, which allows the application to set the system time.
When the attacker behavior increases the Unused Permissions Percentage, it the classifiers’ job becomes easier to distinguish the adapted malware if it calls the permission
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android.permission.SET TIME. The performance of both classifiers increases at the
same time.
Table 5.13: Average impact score a of FARM over the best baseline on reduced
percentage of API package call attack
Classification Problem
a
Goodware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
-0.7319
Goodware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
-3.2924
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic)
-1.1666
Goodware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
0.6750
Goodware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
-3.6451
Goodware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
-0.9673
Other-malware vs. Rooting (No-Isomorphic)
0.2623
Other-malware vs. Rooting (Isomorphic)
6.1428
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (No-Isomorphic) -0.0247
Other-malware vs. Banking Trojan (Isomorphic)
-0.0212
Other-malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
-1.1666
Other-malware vs. Spyware (Isomorphic)
0.6750

Reduced API feature attack. Third, we assume that attackers are more strategic
and capable — we allow them to selectively drop some API package calls by 1 when
the original value is at least 2. Table 5.13 shows that the impact of this attack on
FARM ranges from -3.64-6.14, suggesting a wide variation. On 11 of 12 cases, FARM
outperforms the best baseline, but in one case (Other malware vs. Rooting malware),
the best baseline outperforms FARM. Again, on average, FARM performs very well,
with the accuracy of FARM often improving under this attack. This is because the
modified malware achieves its malicious purpose by calling specific API calls and
because the number of called APIs can be decreased but cannot be fully removed.
The results on Rooting malware detection are shown in Figures 5.14 and 5.15. Unlike
the results from the previous two kinds of attack, we see that the reduced API feature
attack is harder for both FARM and traditional classifiers to adapt to. However, the
situation is worse for the baseline classifiers. When distinguishing between rooting
malware and goodware, the F1 performance goes down slightly as the number of
API package calls is reduced. The reason might be that rooting malware gets less
87

Detection and Analysis of Android Malware Families
malicious and more similar to goodware in this case. However, the F1 score goes
up when distinguishing rooting malware from other malware. The reason might be
that as rooting malware is getting more similar to goodware, it ends up being more
distinct from other malware. Table 5.11, Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 show 3 kinds of
applied attack during the robustness test, an impact score is calculated according
to the average of 0% to 20% increased or decreased number of APIs or permissions.
The performance under attack is always increasing because our classifiers distinguish
Goodware vs. Malware on API or Permission features. When we simulate the attack,
we increase the number of unused APIs or permissions in malware, and so can detect
the malware easier because some API or permission features may not be used by
both goodware or malware, but now more malware calls the common unused feature,
leading to better classification results. Again, FARM performs better than the baseline.
When we decrease 1 for some of called APIs (frequency

2 to keep its malicious

function) in malware, no obvious change in the performance because the feature space
doesn’t change too much compared to the previous two attacks. At the same time,
FARM still has better performance.
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Figure 5.10: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android rooting malware detection: Goodware
vs.
Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.11: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android rooting malware detection: Other Malware vs.
Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.12: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android rooting malware detection:
Goodware
vs. Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.13: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android rooting malware detection:
Other
Malware vs. Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.14: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android rooting malware detection:
Goodware vs. Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.15: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android rooting malware detection:
Other
Malware vs. Rooting Malware (No-Isomorphic)
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Figure 5.16: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android Banking Trojans detection: Goodware
vs.
Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

Figure 5.17: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android Banking Trojans detection: Other Malware vs.
Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

Figure 5.18: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android Banking Trojans detection:
Goodware
vs. Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

Figure 5.19: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android Banking Trojans detection:
Other
Malware vs. Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

Figure 5.20: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android Banking Trojans detection:
Goodware vs. Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

Figure 5.21: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android Banking Trojans detection: Other
Malware vs. Banking Trojans (Isomorphic)

90

Detection and Analysis of Android Malware Families

Figure 5.22: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android Spyware detection: Goodware vs.
Spyware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.23: Impact of fake API package call
attack on
Android Spyware detection: Other Malware vs.
Spyware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.24: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android Spyware detection: Goodware
vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.25: Impact of increased percentage of
permissions
attack on Android Spyware detection: Other
Malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.26: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android Spyware detection:
Goodware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)

Figure 5.27: Impact of reduced percentage of
API package
call attack on Android Spyware detection: Other
Malware vs. Spyware (No-Isomorphic)
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Chapter 6

SAAM: Stability Analysis of
Android Malware Families
Section 6.1

Introduction
Android is one of the most popular operating systems nowadays. Android devices
provide high-performance services for human users while also storing sensitive and
personal information. As a result, Android malware has been actively used by
cybercriminals to execute malicious behavior on Android platforms.
Based on the nature of the malicious behavior, Android malware samples are categorized into di↵erent types (such as banking trojans, spyware, and rooting malware).
Multiple malware families persist in each malware category. For instance, FakeBank,
AceCard, Svpeng are all well known families of Android Banking trojans. Likewise,
SMSspy and SpyOO are well known families of Android spyware. A collection of
Android malware from the same family is produced from the same source code base. A
malware family can evade the constantly improving malware detection techniques and
persist for several years by continuously evolving. Studying the underlying malware
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family evolvement is essential for defending the Android system.
There are some existing e↵orts from academia and industry on malware families
[92, 59, 93, 94]. However, they focus on summarizing the patterns or behaviors of
malware samples in the same family. As far as we know, there is no existing research
on how malware samples from the same family evolve to cope with the environment
change and the innovation of malware detection techniques. We aim to fix this gap and
execute research on 122 popular Android malware families and 120 popular Android
goodware families.
Intuitively, the features of malware samples from the same family would show
di↵erent characteristics according to malware’s function and target.
(a) Some features are mainly related to the APK’s function, e.g., to play music.
Since malware samples from the same family might disguise themselves with
di↵erent functionality, these features are hard to predict.
(b) Some features are closely related to the APK’s target, i.e., the malware family’s
malicious behavior. These features might be (1) relatively stable over time to
achieve the malware’s purpose; (2) evolving or diminishing over time to cope
with emerging detection techniques, especially after the family is named.
We extract features for Android applications and define stability for features
based on its change on a set of variants from the same malware/goodware family. By
analyzing the properties of di↵erent features, we observe some interesting phenomenons
presented in this work.

Section 6.2

Feature Vector Partition
Assume that there are n applications from the same family sorted by the first-seendate [t1 , ..., tn ] (ti  ti+1 ). We extract some features for each application and study
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Figure 6.1: Example signal

how these features evolve over time. For one feature, we denote its value for the n
applications as [x1 , ..., xn ], where xi is the ith application’s feature value. We treat the
time-series value [x1 , ..., xn ] as a signal X.
Example 1. For better explanation and illustration, we select 11 APKs from a malware
family named Boogr and use their “android.telephony” feature values to generate an
example signal. Figure 6.1 plots the signal with respect to the first-seen date of APKs.
Definition 1 (Rate of Change). The rate of change (ROC) of a signal X from time
ti to time tj is
ROC(X, i, j) =

xj
tj

xi
ti

The signal in Example 1 is X = [x1 , ...x11 ]. Specifically, x1 = 11, x3 = 16 and
t3

t1 = 147 with “day” as the unit. Then we can get ROC(X, 1, 3) = (x3

x1 )/(t3

t1 ) = 0.034.
We would define a signal’s stability score according to its partition and the ROC
on each part of the partition. First, we define partition as follows.
Definition 2 (Partition). For a given signal X = [x1 , ..., xn ], where xi are sorted in
ascending order according to their timestamp ti , a partition P is derived by separating
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X into a set of disjoint signal segments.
For a given partition, there are two properties.
(a) Any pair of adjacent segments share a common point. Formally, if [xja , ..., xjb ]
and [xjc , ..., xjd ] are two adjacent segments from a partition of X, then jb = jc .
(b) The start point of the first segment is x1 and the end point of the last segment
is xn .
Note that a partition P with m 1 segments can be denoted by m check points (i.e., the
start and end points of all segments), thus we define it as P = [pt1 , ..., ptm ] ⇢ [1, ..., n],
where pt1 = 1, ptm = n. Apparently, |P|

2 because it always includes 1 and n.

Recall Example 1, a partition P = [1, 4, 11] means X is divided into 2 segments,
[x1 , ..., x4 ] and [x4 , ..., x11 ].
Definition 3 (⌧ -Homogeneous Partition). A ⌧ -homogeneous partition of a signal
satisfies following constraints.
(a) Monotonicity. Within each segment [xptj 1 , ..., xptj ], there should be xptj
...  xptj or xptj

1

...

1



xptj .

(b) Homogeneity. The absolute ROC value of all segments should be bounded within
a narrow interval, i.e., |ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj )|  ⌧ .
Recall Example 1, the partition P = [1, 4, 11] is not ⌧ -homogeneous because
the second segment [x4 , ..., x11 ] is not monotonic. Instead, P = [1, 4, 8, 10, 11] is
⌧ -homogeneous.
Note that for a signal X and a ⌧ -homogeneous partition P, a new partition
P 0 = P [ v, 8v 2 N \P may be not a ⌧ -homogeneous partition.
Suppose ptj

1

 v  ptj , then P 0 leads to m segments, m

2 of which are exactly

the same as that of partition P and they obey Definition 3. However, the other two
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segments [xptj 1 , ..., xv ] and [xv , ..., xptj ] may not obey homogeneity constraint of the
definition. We can use a simple counter-example to show that. If tv
xv

xptj

1

tptj

1

! 0 and

> 0, then ROC(X, ptj 1 , v) ! 1. Thus, there is no way to guarantee

ROC(X, ptj 1 , v) < ⌧ .
Proposition 1 For a signal X and a ⌧ -homogeneous partition P = [pt1 , ..., ptm ],
if there are two adjacent segments [xptj 1 , ..., xptj ] and [xptj , ..., xptj+1 ] with the same
monotonicity direction (increasing or decreasing), we can get a new ⌧ -homogeneous
partition P 00 = P\{ptj }.
Proof. The new partition P 00 has m

1 check points and thus m

2 segments, m

3

of which are the same with that of the original partition. Thus we only need to prove
the new segment [xptj 1 , ..., xptj+1 ] obeys Definition 3.
(a) Monotonicity. Since segments [xptj 1 , ..., xptj ] and [xptj , ..., xptj+1 ] has the same
monotonicity direction (increasing or decreasing), we can easily get [xptj 1 , ..., xptj+1 ]
are monotonic.
(b) Homogeneity. Assume that we denote

xptj xptj
tptj tptj

From the properties of partition P, both |

x1
|
t1

=

x1
t1

and |

x2
|
t2

1
1

and

xptj+1 xptj
tptj+1 tptj

=

x2
.
t2

are less or equal than

⌧ . The rate of change of the segment [xptj 1 , ..., xptj+1 ] from P 00 is
ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj+1 ) =

Assume that |

x1
|
t1

|

x2
|
t2

xptj+1
tptj+1

xptj
tptj

1

|ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj+1 )| 

x2 |
t2

+ | x2 |

t1 +

x2
.
t2

t1 |

thus

1

 ⌧ , we can get | x1 | 
t1 |

x1 +
t1 +

=

t2

=

x2 |
,
t2

| x2 |
 ⌧.
t2

Similarly, we can show |ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj+1 )|  ⌧ also holds when ⌧
|

x2
|.
t2

|

x1
|
t1

Therefore, the new segment of P 00 satisfies the homogeneity constraint.
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We want to find a homogeneous partition that satisfies two requirements: (i) keeps
⌧ as small as possible so that the change within a segment is small, and (ii) keeps
the number of segments small so that changes across segments is small. We therefore
associate a score ↵⌧ + (1

↵)|P |/|X|. We can then introduce a formal definition of

an “(↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition” to be the one that minimizes this objective function.
Definition 4 ((↵, ⌧ )-Optimal Partition). The (↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition of a signal is
a ⌧ -homogeneous partition that has minimum weighted sum of the upper-bound of
|P|
segment rate of change and the number of segments, i.e., ↵⌧ + (1 ↵) |X|
with ⌧ 2 [0, 1],

where ↵, 1

↵ are the corresponding weights.

The (↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition is computed via the following optimization problem
OHP.

OHP : min
P,⌧

s.t.

↵⌧ + (1

↵)

|P|
|X|

(6.1)

M t(X, ptj 1 , ptj ) = 1, 8j 2 {1, ..., m + 1}

(6.2)

|ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj )|  ⌧, 8j 2 {1, ..., m + 1}

(6.3)

Note that M t(X, ptj 1 , ptj ) is the function to test the monotonicity of the j th segment.
M t(X, ptj 1 , ptj ) = 1 if and only if values in [xptj 1 , ..., xptj ] monotonically increase or
decrease.
Theorem 1. The solution of OHP is the (↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition with the minimum
|P| for any given ↵ 2 [0, 1].
Proof. For a given signal X, let us use obj(P, ⌧ ) to denote the objective value of the
OHP with given variables P and ⌧ . Obviously, the partition P = X\{x1 , xn }, which
leads to n

1 segments is the largest partition and ⌧ -homogeneous. From Proposition

6.2, we can see that if there are adjacent segments of the same monotonicity direction,
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combining a pair of them will never increase the ⌧ value while the number of segments
will decrease by 1. Thus, if we use ptj to denote the check point that separates the
pair of segments, obviously obj(P\{ptj }, ⌧ ) < obj(P, ⌧ ). Therefore, we can iterate
this process until all adjacent segments with identical monotonicity are combined,
during which the partition size |P| is minimized. Meanwhile, the objective value is
minimized.
Therefore, we can find the solution of OHP using Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Algorithm for OHP
Input:X
Output:P
Initialize: P = ;
if |X| < 3 then
return P
// Set the left and right indices of the current partition
indl = 1, indr = 2
while indr < n do
if (xindr +1 xindr )(xindr xindl ) > 0 then
indr + = 1
else
indl = indr , indr = indr + 1
P = P [ {indl }
Return: P

Then, we define stability score ss based on the optimal homogeneous partition of
a signal.
Definition 5 (Stability Score). Given a signal X and its ⌧ -homogeneous partition P =
[pt1 , ..., ptm ], we can get m + 1 segments from X. For the j th segment [xptj 1 , ..., xptj ],
we can get its rate of change ROC(X, ptj 1 , ptj ). We then define the stability score of
signal X under partition P = [pt1 , ..., ptm ] as
ss(X, P) = 1

↵⌧
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The intuition behind the stability score is that we want both a small ↵⌧ and a
small (1

↵)|P |/|X|. So we want the sum of these two terms to be as small as possible.

As we want the stability score to be larger for more stable features, we subtract their
sum from 1, getting the above formula.
Discussion about the normalization of stability score. After the definition of the
stability score, we would like to be sure it makes sense when it is used to compare a
number of signals. For example, when we want to compare a number of features for a
set of samples from the same Android family, and in this case, users would need to
normalize the features into [0, 1] and select the suitable time unit such that minimum
tj

tj

1

= 1. Then there is ⌧ 2 (0, 1] and for each signal the maximum possible ⌧

is 1. By selecting a working ↵ 2 (0, 1) according to users’ requirement, ss is always
bounded within [0, 1] and it is comparable among di↵erent signals.
Proposition 2 For a given signal X and its ⌧ -Homogeneous Partition P, the stability
score ss(X, P) is maximized when P is the optimal solution of problem OHP.
Recall that in Example 1, the (↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition is P = [1, 4, 8, 11]. We
compute the ROC in those 3 segments from the partition and get ROC(X, 1, 4) =
0.1275, ROC(X, 4, 8) = 0.1870, ROC(X, 8, 11) = 0.0591. Thus there is ⌧ = 0.1870 and
the stability score of this signal is ss = 1

0.1870↵

(1

↵)2/11 = 0.8182

0052↵.

Section 6.3

Signal Smoothing
We note that the homogeneous partition of a signal is vulnerable to noises in the
signal. For example, Figure 6.2 shows x2 in the original signal as shown in Figure 6.1
is influenced by the noise and increase to a value greater than x3 . In this case, the
(↵, ⌧ )-optimal partition is now P = [1, 2, 4, 8, 11], which is di↵erent from before. The
stability score would also be changed. To minimize the potential influence from noises,
we adopt signal processing techniques for further analysis.
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Figure 6.2: Example signal. Assume the second value x2 of the original signal in Figure 6.1 is
influenced by the noise and increases to a value greater than x3 .

In particular, we apply the Moving-Average Signal Smoothing method to the
feature signal. By smoothing the signal over time, the influence of noises will be
decreased. Moving-average technique is a standard one. Specifically, there are two
approaches to achieve it on our feature signal, which has n sorted values in X with
their timestamps t1 to tn .
The first choice is to smooth the signal with respect to a window size T of time.
Each xi with ti

T + t1 is smoothed as x̄i = avettii0 =ti

T xi0 .

In this case, the smoothed

signal X̄ is shorter than X as the values with ti < T + t1 are discarded.
Another choice is to smooth the signal without consideration of the time information.
Assume there is a window size M , then xi will be smoothed as x̄i = aveii0 =i

T xi0 ,

which

is the average of T + 1 values.
Despite the moving-average method, we may also try other techniques. For
example, Gaussian filter that gets the weighted average using the discretized Gaussian
P
function. For example, x̄i = ii0 =i T xi0 gi i0 , where gi i0 is the corresponding weight
P
and ii0 =i T gi i0 = 1.
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Section 6.4

Studies and Analysis of SAAM Dataset
6.4.1. Dataset
We select 122 popular malware families according to the published Android Malware
Variants lists [95, 96] for our study. For each family (e.g., FakeBank, Svpeng, etc.),
we download a number of malware samples (approximately 60 samples in each family)
detected between 2012 and 2019 on VirusTotal. We also collect Android malware
families’ detection time from Kaspersky1 and Symantec2 . Also, our dataset includes
the top 120 popular goodware families (e.g., YouTube, Zoom, etc.) from the Top
free Apps list on Google Play Store3 , and we also collect approximately 60 samples
for each goodware family, and the di↵erent samples have di↵erent first release date
between 2012 to 2020, and we use their first release date as the timestamp in the later
experiment. Therefore, we have 14,489 (7,648 malware + 6,841 goodware) samples in
total.
After getting the sample datasets, we extract the related features from the analysis
report from VirusTotal, and then we union all the feature vectors together to get our
final feature file. After the feature combination, we have 885 features in total, and 208
API package features as defined in Google Android Developer Guides4 , 227 Operation
code features5 , 346 Permission features6 and 104 System Command features7 .
1

https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/threat
https://www.symantec.com/security-center/threats
3
https://play.google.com/store/apps/top?hl=en_US&gl=US
4
https://developer.android.com/about/versions/marshmallow/android-6.0
5
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-1-4302-4249-9%2F1.pdf
6
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission
7
https://ss64.com/bash/
2
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6.4.2. Demo of feature signals in Android Malware Families
After defining the stability score in Definition 5, we implement a stability score demo
system to visualize the top stable or unstable feature signals as Figure 6.3 and Figure
6.4 shows, where Figure 6.3 shows the top 3 stable feature signals in the Adware
malware family with name Airpush8 , and Figure 6.4 displays the top 3 unstable
feature signals in the Android Banking Trojans family named Svpeng9 . According to
F-secure, Airpush is a kind of Android application that pushes advertising content
to the device’s notification bar intrusively. Svpeng can steal the victim’s bank login
information by displaying a fake login interface to intercept the user’s normal request.
In the demo figure system, the user can choose various parameters to visualize
the feature signal di↵erently. The first parameter specifies the way to plot the signal,
whether the interval between points is divided by the sample itself or by the gap
timestamp between the sample. The second parameter decides which malware family’s
feature is displayed on the panel, and all 122 malware families’ feature signals are
available. The third parameter decides the ↵ used to calculate the stability score as
defined in Definition 5. The fourth parameter controls the numbers of top feature
signals to show. The fifth parameter specifies the smoothing method applied to the
feature signal as defined in Section 6.3, while the last parameter decides whether to
display the top stable or unstable features.
In Figure 6.3, it shows that the top 3 stable features are API package android,
android.annotation and android.app.assist, and all their stability score equals 1 with
the malware family detection date (the vertical green dotted line) on March 28, 2014.
There are 76 samples in the chosen Airpush family, with the sample’s timestamp
ranges from November 1, 2011, to August 2, 2019. The feature signal is also smoothed
with the time-based sliding window method, and the window size equals 60 days. The
stability score parameter ↵ equals 0.25. Similarly, in Figure 6.4, the top 3 unstable
8
9

https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/trojan_android_airpush.shtml
https://threats.kaspersky.com/en/threat/Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng/
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features in the Svpeng family are the total detection number of antivirus engines on
VirusTotal, the permission of BIND DEVICE ADMIN, and the filesize of the malware
sample. This time, the top unstable feature signals’ stability score is less than 1 with
↵ equals to 0.75 using the event-based smoothing method with window size equals to
2.
Therefore, with the help of the Stability Score demo system, users can easily
distinguish the top stable or unstable feature signals of di↵erent Android malware
families in our datasets.

Figure 6.3: Demo GUI of Airpush Top stable feature signals

6.4.3. Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we use 3 metrics in result discussion.
• avem (f ), aveg (f ), the average stability score of the feature f across all malware/goodware families;
• stdm (f ), stdg (f ), the standard deviation of feature f ’s stability score across all
malware/goodware families;
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Figure 6.4: Demo GUI of Svpeng Top unstable feature signals

• etpm (f ), etpg (f ), the entropy of feature f ’s stability score values across all
malware/goodware families. Specifically, since the stability score is a value
between 0 and 1, we first discretize the ss values into bins, then compute the
entropy.
Definition 6 (M Gµ ratio). The M Gµ ratio is a metric to evaluate a feature’s stability
among malware versus goodware based on a parameter µ. Here we consider 3 di↵erent
values of µ, i.e., the stability score’s average ave, standard deviation std and entropy
etp. Formally,
M Gµ (f ) =

µm (f )
µg (f )

Note that M Gave (f ) > 1 (resp. < 1) means the feature is more stable among
malware than goodware (resp. the inverse); in contrast, when µ = std or etp, M Gµ (f )
has the opposite meaning.
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6.4.4. Distribution of Stability Score in Android application families
After calculating the stability score for each feature in each Android application family
(122 malware families + 120 goodware families), we plot the distribution of di↵erent
kinds of features (API Package, Permission, Opcode, and System Command) as the
following figures show.
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of average stability score on API Package features
between goodware and malware families. From the figure, we can see that 17.79%
of the features have a stability score  0.85 in malware families, and no features in
goodware families have a stability score  0.85. 29.32% of the features have a stability
score  0.9 in malware families, and in the case of goodware, it is under 15.86%.
We can claim that API Package features are more stable in goodware families than
malware families according to the definition of stability score with a p-value equals to
0.002, which means the results are significant.

p = 0.002

Figure 6.5: Distribution of average stability score on API Package features

Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of average stability score on Permission features
between goodware and malware families. From the figure, we can see that 3.18% of the
features have a stability score  0.9 in malware families and no features in goodware
families have a stability score  0.9. 8.96% of the features have a stability score 
0.95 in malware families, and in the case of goodware, it is under 0.87%. We can claim
that Permission features are more stable in goodware families than malware families
according to the definition of stability score with a p-value equals to 6.487 ⇥ 10 9 ,
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which means the results are significant.

p = 6.487e-9

Figure 6.6: Distribution of average stability score on Permission features

Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of average stability score on Opcode features
between goodware and malware families. From the figure, we can see that 4.41%
of the features have a stability score  0.75 in malware families and no features in
goodware families have a stability score  0.75. 20.26% of the features have a stability
score  0.77 in malware families, and in the case of goodware, it is under 3.08%. We
can claim that Opcode features are more stable in goodware families than malware
families according to the definition of stability score with a p-value equals to 0.001,
which means the results are significant.

p = 0.001

Figure 6.7: Distribution of average stability score on Opcode features

Figure 6.8 shows the distribution of average stability score on System Command
features between goodware and malware families. From the figure, we can see that
4.81% of the features have a stability score  0.9 in malware families and 0.96% of
features in goodware families have a stability score  0.9. Both 14.42% of the features
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have a stability score  0.95 in goodware and malware families. This time, the p-value
equals 0.592, which is greater than 0.05 when we are comparing the stability scores in
the System Command features, so we believe that System Command-based features
are equally stable in goodware and malware families according to the definition of
stability score.

p = 0.592

Figure 6.8: Distribution of average stability score on System Command features

6.4.5. M Gµ ratio with average Stability Score, Entropy and Standard Deviation
This section analyzes the M Gµ ratio with average stability score, entropy, and standard
deviation in our dataset. We want to know if the M Gµ ratio can reveal the stability
of the general features in the goodware and malware families.
Figure 6.9 shows the M Gavg with average stability score. From the left sub-figure,
we can observe that about half features are stable in goodware families, and the other
half of the features are relatively stable in malware families. From the right sub-figure,
each dot corresponds to one feature, and the diagonal line divides the features with
M Gavg greater than or less than 1. Similarly, we can see that near half features have
M Gavg

1 and the M Gavg of the other half features  1. Therefore, we cannot make

a strong conclusion on the stability analysis of general features by defining M Gavg
here with the p-value equals to 0.442.
Figure 6.10 shows the M Gent with the entropy of stability score. From the left
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p = 0.442
p = 0.442

(b) Mean stability score in Goodware
vs. Mean stability score in Malware

(a) Mean stability score vs. M Gavg

Figure 6.9: M Gavg with average stability score

sub-figure, we can observe that for goodware families, the entropy of stability score
seems equally distributed, while the dots of M Gent falls under the area of the inverse
function, while for malware families, the entropy of stability score seems equally
distributed, and both very stable and unstable features have low M Gent . From the
right sub-figure, we can observe that more features have larger entropy (more unstable)
in malware families than goodware families. The p-value equals 0.038 in this analysis
and we can make a strong claim of the stability on the entropy of stability score vs.
M Gent .

p = 0.038

p = 0.038

(b)(b) Entropy of stability score in
Goodware vs. Mean entropy in
Malware

(a) Entropy of stability score vs.
M Gent

Figure 6.10: M Gent with the entropy of stability score

Figure 6.11 shows the M Gstd with the standard deviation of stability score. From
the left sub-figure, we can observe that the standard deviation of all features’ stability
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scores seems equally distributed in both goodware and malware families. Also, very
few features have large M Gstd , while most features have low M Gstd . From the right
sub-figure, we can observe that more features have a larger standard deviation (more
unstable) in malware families than goodware families. Therefore, we can conclude that
general features are more stable (with a larger standard deviation) in goodware families
than in malware families according to the definition of M Gstd , and the statistical
analysis is significant with p-value equals to 3.182 ⇥ 10

10

.

p = 3.182e-10
p = 3.182e-10

(b) The standard deviation of stability
score in Goodware vs. the standard
deviation of stability score in Malware

(a) The standard deviation of stability
score vs. M Gstd

Figure 6.11: M Gstd with the standard deviation of stability score

6.4.6. M Gµ ratio with di↵erent features
In this section, we conduct experiments on 3 M Gµ ratios on 4 di↵erent kinds of
features (API Packages, Permission, Opcode, and System Command). We want to
know if the M Gµ ratio can reveal the stability of all di↵erent types of features in
the goodware and malware families. We have done many experiments on the M Gµ
ratio in this section, but because of the page limitation, we only put some significant
results in this section. In the following Section 6.4.7, we summarize all the results
from these 3 di↵erent definitions of MG ratio and the stability analysis of di↵erent
kinds of features.
Figure 6.12 shows the M Gavg with mean stability score among API Package
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features in goodware and malware families. From the left sub-figure, we can see that
some features are relatively unstable in malware families with the stability score <
0.87, while all API features in goodware families have the stability score > 0.87. Also,
we can claim that for API package features, features are more stable in goodware
families than in malware families with p-value equals to 0.002  0.05, which means
the result is significant.

p = 0.002

p = 0.002

(b) Mean stability score in Goodware
vs. Mean stability score in Malware
among API Package features

(a) Mean stability score among API
Package features vs. M Gavg

Figure 6.12: M Gavg with mean stability score among API Package features

Figure 6.13 shows the M Gent with the entropy of the stability score among
Permission features in goodware and malware families. From the left sub-figure,
we observe that for goodware families, the entropy of stability score seems equally
distributed, while the dots of the corresponding M Gent fall under the area of the
Inverse function. Again, we see that from the right sub-figure, most permission
features in malware families have larger entropy than in the goodware families, which
means that features are more stable in goodware families than in malware families
in Permission features. The statistical analysis is conducted with a p-value equals to
3.352 ⇥ 10

12

, which means the result is significant.

Last, Figure 6.14 shows the M Gstd with the standard deviation of the stability score
among Opcode features in goodware and malware families. From the left sub-figure,
we observe that the standard deviation of Opcode features’ stability score forming
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p = 3.352e-12

p = 3.352e-12

(b) Entropy of the stability score in
Goodware vs. Entropy of the stability
score in Malware among Permission
features

(a) Entropy of the stability score
among Permission features vs. M Gent

Figure 6.13: M Gent with the entropy of the stability score among Permission features

two concentrated clusters, and most Opcode features in both goodware and malware
families have M Gstd ranges from 1 to 1.75. Also, we see that from the right sub-figure,
most Opcode features in malware families have a larger standard deviation than in the
goodware families, which means that features are more stable in goodware families
than in malware families in Opcode features. The significant analysis with p-value
equals to 1.069 ⇥ 10

26

also supports our claim.

p = 1.069e-26

p = 1.069e-26

(b) The standard deviation of stability
score in Goodware vs. the standard
deviation of stability score in Malware
among Permission features

(a) The standard deviation of stability
score among Opcode features vs.
M Gstd

Figure 6.14: M Gstd with the standard deviation of stability score among Opcode features
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6.4.7. Conclusions
According to the extensive experiments we conduct on 3 di↵erent M Gµ ratio (stability
score, entropy, and standard deviation) with 4 di↵erent features in Android goodware
and malware families, we can make the following conclusions, where Very strong means
all M Gµ support the conclusion, Strong means 2 of 3 M Gµ support the conclusion,
Weak means only 1 M Gµ supports the conclusion.
Conclusion 1. There is strong evidence that general features are more stable in
goodware families than in malware families.
Conclusion 2. There is weak evidence that API Package features are more stable in
goodware families than in malware families.
Conclusion 3. There is very strong evidence that Permission features are more stable
in goodware families than in malware families.
Conclusion 4. There is very strong evidence that Opcode features are more stable in
goodware families than in malware families.
Conclusion 5. There is evidence that System Command features are equally stable
in goodware families and malware families.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Section 7.1

Conclusions
With the rise in popularity of the Internet of Things, 5G, and other technology, mobile
smart devices are increasingly evolving, and the number of Android apps mounted
on smart terminals such as smartphones and tablets is growing. However, malware
targeting the platform has risen as a result of this. As a consequence, there has
been a lot of work done on detecting malware in Android apps. Artificial intelligence
techniques like machine learning and deep learning have significantly increased the
chances of detecting Android malware. This thesis introduces advanced and robust
features for detecting specific Android malware families using data-driven analysis
and characterization techniques. This thesis’s main goal is to provide a comprehensive
summarization of the proposed e↵ective Android malware detection systems and the
Android malware feature stability analysis system.
First, we have presented DBank, a novel framework for distinguishing between
Android banking trojans (ABTs) and goodware, and other types of malware. In
particular, we propose a feature set based on the novel concept of Triadic Suspicion

113

Conclusions and Future Work
Graph (TSG). We show that, while we achieve similar accuracy to lightweight feature
sets in past work, TSG-based features are more robust to some adversary attacks, and
still achieves high accuracy even when using a subset of training data. We evaluate
our system on recent (2016-2017) Android ABTs, and we show how DBank can
automatically extract relevant features that can highlight di↵erences from specific
ABT families vs. goodware and other-malware. The concept of Triadic Suspicion
Graph can not only be applied to the field of Android malware detection but can also
be applied to other machine learning tasks when there is some hidden relationship
between both the positive and negative samples. Our method may contribute to a
more robust system with potential higher accuracy.
Second, we present a data-driven characterization of the principal factors that
distinguish modern Android spyware (July 2016 - July 2017) both from goodware
and other Android malware, using both traditional machine learning classifier and
the proposed Ensemble Late Fusion (ELF) architecture that combines the results of
multiple classifiers’ predicted probabilities to generate a final prediction. We show that
ELF outperforms several of the best-known traditional and deep learning classifiers.
The proposed Ensemble Late Fusion (ELF) architecture can always improve (at least
lead to no compromise) the general machine learning classification results because of
the mathematical attributes behind it, and at the same time, ELF can reveal the best
classifier combination that should be used in di↵erent classification tasks according to
the weight distribution of each classifier.
Third, our FARM (Android Malware Detection via (Somewhat) Robust Irreversible
Feature Transformations) technique is novel and makes the following contributions: (i)
we propose three new feature transformation techniques that can be used to generate
feature vectors that are very hard to reverse engineer; (ii) we propose the FARM
techniques that use these transforms to predict whether a given Android APK is
a form of malware or not — we consider three forms of malware, namely spyware,
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banking trojans and rooting malware. (iii) we propose three new kinds of attacks that
a malicious hacker might take to evade standard classifiers and show that FARM is
quite robust against these kinds of attacks. In particular, when there are no attacks,
FARM slightly outperforms various baselines and when these three attacks are used,
FARM is on average about 3 times more robust than the baselines. At the same
time, our work is not purely theoretical: FARM has discovered two Android APKs
to be rooting apps before any of the 61 anti-viruses on VirusTotal came to the same
conclusion. These samples were reported to Google’s Android Security Team who
have confirmed the labeling of these samples as rooting apps. The proposed FARM’s
feature transformations can not only be applied to the Android malware detection
system, but also on any set of “base” features to increase the robustness of the machine
learning-based system under certain types of attacks.
Last, we introduce SAAM (Stability Analysis of Android Malware Families) and
investigate how malware samples from the same family changing over time and the
efficiency of detection techniques at the feature level. In the meantime, we define
optimal-partition, stability score, and three di↵erent kinds of MG (malware over
goodware) ratio on the features over time in Android apk families. We also conduct
stability score analysis on 122 families of malware between 2012-2019 from VirusTotal,
and 120 families of goodware between 2012-2020 from Google Play Top free apps,
with an average of 60 samples for each family. Finally, we summarize 4 kinds of top
stable and unstable features over all the collected Android apk families, especially on
Android API features, Android Permission features, Operation Code features, and
System Command features. The definitions of optimal-partition, stability score, and
MG ratio can be applied to any field when the object under study can be transformed
into a time-continuous signal. After analyzing the signal, we may be able to link
to some external burst events from the key points in the signal, so that we can get
a better understanding of the signal itself. In addition, after analyzing the time-

115

Conclusions and Future Work
continuous signal, we are also able to summarize some e↵ective information to aid
machine learning classification tasks, thereby further improving the performance of
the classifier.

Section 7.2

Limitations
This section presents limitations and suggestions for future improvement of the current
work on Android malware detection and characterization.
First, the dynamic analysis we perform through the Koodous [43] online service
does not cover all possible execution traces. In particular, Koodous relies on the
Droidbox[97] sandbox, executes samples for 60 seconds, and collects any system and
network activity detected during execution. Since the malware may detect that it is
running in a sandbox and/or because its behavior may be triggered only by certain
events (e.g., initiated by the attacker’s command and control server), some dynamic
behavior may be missed. Very recent work [98, 99] studies in-depth how to trigger
malicious behaviors of malware by simulating user interactions, but the problem
remains an open issue and future work could look at integrating these approaches into
dynamic analysis.
Second, it is worth observing that some downloaded Android apk samples crashed
during dynamic analysis on Koodous and therefore are not included in the analysis in
this thesis. While this could indicate that our study is not complete, this limitation is
common in prior work that uses dynamic analysis to study Android malware. Some
strategies to prevent crashing of samples may be worth investigating in future work.
Third, the feature transformation techniques also have some limitations that we
discuss briefly below. Though FARM’s feature transformations can be applied to
any set of “base” features, it is important that this set of base features be selected
judiciously and be capable of making good predictions. In this thesis, we chose base
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features that have been shown in the literature to be useful for classifying Android
apps into benign vs. malicious samples. Also, we have shown that FARM is robust
against three types of attack. However, there may be other kinds of attacks (e.g.
attacks that do not depend on API function calls or permissions that we have not
tested against). While we do not expect to find classifiers that are robust against
every type of attack, identifying a larger space of attacks and showing how FARM
either is robust to those attacks or could be modified to withstand those attacks is an
important future research topic.

Section 7.3

Future Work
In this thesis, we characterize Android Banking Trojans, Spyware, and rooting malware
with respect to goodware and to other malware. We rely on machine learning features
derived from lightweight static and dynamic analysis of Android samples. In future
work, it would be interesting to consider additional techniques to gain more insights
into specific Android malware families. Examples of such techniques include (i)
designing new features to represent sequence and timing of dynamic operations; (ii)
integrating dynamic analysis techniques for detecting which specific information is
likely leaked through di↵erent channels (e.g. network, SMS, files on disk) through
which such leaks occur; (iii) performing in-depth inspections of application source code
and control-flow to link the malware behavior to the code; (iv) considering more real
cases of the adversarial model in which the adversaries tampers with our training data
(poisoning) or performs test-time evasion attacks; (v) Another interesting research
direction is to explore multi-label classification—for instance, acecard is both spyware
and a banking trojan, and a system that can automatically predict a set of labels for
each app would be useful for capturing multiple malicious behaviors at once.
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[47] Thomas Bläsing, Leonid Batyuk, Aubrey-Derrick Schmidt, Seyit Ahmet Camtepe,
and Sahin Albayrak. An android application sandbox system for suspicious
software detection. In 2010 5th International Conference on Malicious and
Unwanted Software, pages 55–62. IEEE, 2010.
[48] Dong-Jie Wu, Ching-Hao Mao, Te-En Wei, Hahn-Ming Lee, and Kuo-Ping Wu.
Droidmat: Android malware detection through manifest and api calls tracing. In
2012 Seventh Asia Joint Conference on Information Security, pages 62–69. IEEE,
2012.
[49] Justin Sahs and Latifur Khan. A machine learning approach to android malware
detection. In 2012 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference,
pages 141–147. IEEE, 2012.
[50] Suleiman Y Yerima, Sakir Sezer, Gavin McWilliams, and Igor Muttik. A new android malware detection approach using bayesian classification. In 2013 IEEE 27th
international conference on advanced information networking and applications
(AINA), pages 121–128. IEEE, 2013.
[51] Win Zaw Zarni Aung. Permission-based android malware detection. International
Journal of Scientific & Technology Research, 2(3):228–234, 2013.

7

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[52] Saurabh Chakradeo, Bradley Reaves, Patrick Traynor, and William Enck. Mast:
Triage for market-scale mobile malware analysis. In Proceedings of the sixth ACM
conference on Security and privacy in wireless and mobile networks, pages 13–24.
ACM, 2013.
[53] Naser Peiravian and Xingquan Zhu. Machine learning for android malware
detection using permission and api calls. In 2013 IEEE 25th international
conference on tools with artificial intelligence, pages 300–305. IEEE, 2013.
[54] Yousra Aafer, Wenliang Du, and Heng Yin. Droidapiminer: Mining api-level
features for robust malware detection in android. In International conference on
security and privacy in communication systems, pages 86–103. Springer, 2013.
[55] Hugo Gascon, Fabian Yamaguchi, Daniel Arp, and Konrad Rieck. Structural
detection of android malware using embedded call graphs. In Proceedings of the
2013 ACM workshop on Artificial intelligence and security, pages 45–54. ACM,
2013.
[56] Borja Sanz, Igor Santos, Carlos Laorden, Xabier Ugarte-Pedrero, Pablo Garcia
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